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INTRODUCTION
Ecclesiastes rightly declares that there is nothing new under the
sun.1 The biblical author of course did not have contemporary
United States tax policy in mind, but no matter: the observation fits
just the same. Ideas about tax policy and tax reform cycle every
few years through a narrow range of proposals that lead policymakers and interest groups over familiar terrain. The details may
change modestly from one round to the next, but the outcomes are
more or less invariant. After a few turns of the cycle, one may be
sorely tempted to agree that the whole point of the exercise is, in
fact, just to maintain the constant motion of the process. Policymakers who propose tax reforms that interest groups oppose can
extract rents from those groups in a cynical bargain either to retreat from the reforms or, in the event the reforms become law, to
undo them through future legislation.2 Old policy proposals serve
this end just as well as new ones; indeed, old proposals may be
preferable if they allow policymakers and interest groups to anticipate the endgame with greater confidence.
Whatever the motivations that drive the cyclical nature of tax
policy, a recent turn of the wheel has again put forth one of the
more intriguing reform proposals: relief from the double taxation
of corporate income. The corporate income tax is now 100 years

1

Ecclesiastes 1:9.
See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate
and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987); J. Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply
to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1155 (1989).
2
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old,3 and there have been two levels of tax on corporate profits for
most of that period.4 The first tax applies at the corporate level
when profits are earned, and the second tax applies at the shareholder level when profits are distributed as dividends.5 By contrast,
profits earned by non-corporate businesses incur only a single level
of tax.6 This double tax on corporate income is widely regarded as
“unusual, unfair, and inefficient,”7 and numerous government and
academic proposals would repeal it. These proposals typically provide for “integration” of the tax on corporate income and the tax
on individual income such that corporate profits would be taxed
exactly once.8 President Bush made the most serious joust at the
corporate double tax in recent years when he proposed in 2003 that
shareholders be permitted to exclude dividends from income.9 Had
Congress enacted this dividend-exclusion proposal, it would have
eliminated the second level of the double tax.10 Congress instead
decided to scale back the double tax by lowering the
tax rate that shareholders pay on dividends.11 This relief expires in
3

Howard E. Abrams & Richard L. Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation 1 (6th
ed. 2008) (“We have had a corporate income tax continuously since 1909.”).
4
Congress enacted the double taxation of corporate income in 1936. Steven A.
Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 167, 170–71, 228 (2002) [hereinafter Bank, Corporate Managers]; Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613, 619–20 (1990).
5
Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 1.
6
See id. at 11.
7
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,
105 Yale L.J. 325, 326 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 717,
738 (1981).
8
Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 7–16; Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 179–88 (5th ed. 1987). A classic discussion of corporate double taxation and integration is Charles E. McLure, Jr., Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? (1979).
9
Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Taking Action to Strengthen
America’s Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030107-5.html. For extended discussion of the dividend-exclusion proposal, see
infra Part II.
10
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal
Year 2004 Revenue Proposals 12 (2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/bluebk03.pdf [hereinafter Treasury 2003 Bluebook].
11
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, § 302, 117
Stat. 752, 758 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1) [hereinafter Jobs and Growth
Act].
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2010;12 without additional legislation, the full effect of the corporate
double tax will return in 2011.
Proposals for further relief from the corporate double tax are
back near the top of the tax agenda for both political parties as well
as for both the legislative and the executive branches. Two key
players in the formation of tax policy, the House Committee on
Ways and Means and the Treasury Department, have given serious
thought to lowering the tax rate on corporate income in order to
reduce the burden imposed by the first level of the double tax. The
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee has introduced legislation that would lower the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to
30.5 percent; this would be paid for in part through the repeal of
designated corporate tax preferences.13 The Treasury Department
estimates that, by broadening the corporate tax base, the tax rate
on corporations could be lowered to 28 percent without any loss of
federal revenues.14 President Obama has suggested that proposals
to eliminate corporate tax preferences and reduce the corporate
tax rate may be “very appealing.”15
One might reasonably think that integration or other double-tax
relief should be an easy sell in the legislature. If the status quo burdens corporate profits with two levels of tax, removing or reducing
either the tax on corporations or the tax on shareholders ought to
be attractive both to corporations and to shareholders. At a minimum, removing or reducing the double tax should increase after12

The lower tax rates were to expire at the end of 2008, Jobs and Growth Act § 303,
but they were extended by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of
2005, Pub. L. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1).
13
Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3001 (1st. Sess.
2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
110_cong_bills&docid=f:h3970ih.txt.pdf; see also Comm. on Ways & Means, Legislation Summary, H.R. 3970: Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007 (Oct. 29, 2007),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/ 110/Summary%20for%20
Distribution.pdf. News reports indicate that the Chairman is contemplating an even
steeper reduction in the corporate tax rate. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer & Peter
Cook, Rangel Plans Push to Cut Top Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent,
Bloomberg.com, Nov. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en
&refer=&sid=ag7lSuB.yyII.
14
Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Approaches to Improve the
Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century 44 (2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp749_approachesstudy.pdf.
15
Michael Joe, Obama Says Corporate Rate Reduction in Exchange for Closing
Loopholes is a Possibility, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 13, 2009, LEXIS, 2009 TNT 47-1.
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tax returns on corporate investments, even if rent-seeking managers siphon off some of the higher returns through their compensation. And, if the economists at the Treasury Department are correct, double-tax relief should increase overall economic growth,
potentially making everyone better off.16 Large federal budget deficits should pose no obstacle: many proposals would pay for doubletax relief by eliminating corporate tax preferences (pejoratively
known as “loopholes” and “tax breaks”). Why, then, does Congress not enact integration or other double-tax relief by acclamation?
There being nothing new under the sun, the legislature has considered and rejected many integration proposals over the years.17
There are occasional changes at the margins, with the current (but
temporary) reduced tax rates on dividends possibly setting the
high-water mark for double-tax relief. But, as this Article will argue, the “unusual, unfair, and inefficient” double taxation of corporate profits generally has survived recent political challenge because many managers, shareholders, and third parties rationally
prefer having the double tax to not having it. More precisely, the
substantial heterogeneity of interests among managers, shareholders, and collateral interests affected by the double tax ensures that
there are winners as well as losers under the status quo. Many corporations have low effective tax rates that translate into low costs
of equity capital; many shareholders are entirely or partly exempt
from tax, and several industries depend on the existence of the
double tax so that they can sell investments sheltered from it.
These and other managers, shareholders, and collateral interests
benefit from the status quo. Yet, other managers, shareholders,
and collateral interests—including corporations with high effective
tax rates and fully taxable shareholders—do not. Double-tax winners have no rational basis to support integration proposals that
would equalize the after-tax outcomes for themselves and the dou-

16
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and
Global Competitiveness Background Paper 1–2, 710 (2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf [hereinafter Treasury
Background Paper].
17
See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 330 (citing unsuccessful bills).
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ble-tax losers with whom they compete in the capital and business
markets.
The literature on the corporate double tax has missed this critical point. The most prominent political explanation for the persistence of the double tax is the agency-cost explanation set forth by
Jennifer Arlen and Deborah Weiss.18 They argue that shareholders,
who face collective-action and other obstacles to lobbying, generally favor repeal of the double tax but that managers, who control
the lobbying resources of their corporations, generally assign low
priority to integration and in some cases oppose it outright.19 Thus,
they conclude that “the resilience of the corporate [double] tax is a
manifestation of the most enduring source of problems in corporate law, the separation between ownership and control of large
corporations.”20 This agency-cost explanation, however, does not
adequately account for important points, including the substantial
18

Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7. Their analysis remains widely cited and generally
accepted. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 20 (2009);
Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 Geo.
L.J. 889, 894 (2006) [hereinafter Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory]; Bank, Corporate
Managers, supra note 4, at 260–61; Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447, 534–37 (2001)
[hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory]; Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to
New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 591, 593 n.7; Terrence
R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 239, 259 (2003); Joshua Mishkin, The State of Integration in a Partial Integration State, 59 Tax Law. 1047, 1057–58 (2006); Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 34–36 (2003);
Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of
Budget Policy, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 503, 517 (2007); Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the
Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Is It Chasing One’s Tail?, 15 Am. J. Tax Pol’y
167, 184–85, 202–03 (1998); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate
Income Tax, But to Save It, 56 Tax L. Rev. 329, 337 n.11 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 647, 667–68 (1997) (book review). For similar agency-cost accounts, see
James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder
Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 716 (1997); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 410, 411 n.8 (2000).
19
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 327.
20
Id. Without specifically endorsing the analysis of Arlen & Weiss, Alvin Warren
has argued that, “with rare exceptions, corporate management remarkably has been
uninterested in proposals that would eliminate the double taxation of corporate income distributed to shareholders as dividends” and that, “[g]iven the choice, corporate management seems to prefer corporate tax reductions through reduced rates or
accelerated capital cost deductions . . . .” Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax
Reform, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 157, 173 (1997).
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heterogeneity of interests that managers, shareholders, and other
parties have with respect to the double tax or the differential effects that various integration models would have on managers,
shareholders, and other parties. Once the double-tax winners and
losers are identified and the differential effects on those winners
and losers are sorted out, it becomes clear that the persistence of
the corporate double tax cannot be explained simply as a failure of
managers to act in the interests of shareholders. Instead, the underlying political problem is more nuanced, more complex, and more
intractable.
This Article will make three distinct contributions to the existing
literature. First, it will examine the heterogeneity of interests
among managers, shareholders, and other parties regarding the
double tax and the differential effects of various integration proposals on those heterogeneous interests. This examination will suggest that the persistence of the corporate double tax can be attributed not to the divergence of interests between managers
(understood as a single group) and shareholders (understood as a
single group) but to the divergence of interests among managers,
the divergence of interests among shareholders, and the divergence
of interests among other parties affected by the double tax. The
examination will also establish why certain managers, shareholders,
and third parties rationally support certain approaches to eliminating the corporate double tax while other managers, shareholders,
and third parties rationally oppose those approaches but support
different approaches. Second, this Article will provide a detailed
account of the actual lobbying positions taken by managers, shareholders, and collateral interests during the pendency of the Bush
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal. That account will
provide clear and substantial support for the argument that the
story of the corporate double tax must include substantial heterogeneity of interests within the key interest groups. The Bush administration’s proposal failed because managers, shareholders, and
collateral interests lined up on both sides of it and fought to a near
standstill; the lowering of dividend tax rates that Congress ultimately enacted was simply a compromise that found the broadest
support within and among these groups. Third, this Article will
draw out general conclusions and tentative predictions implied by
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this political account of the corporate double tax. Specifically, the
analysis will demonstrate that any integration proposal will elicit
both support and opposition from among managers, shareholders,
and other parties. This inevitability of political winners and losers
implies both that the corporate double tax is well entrenched and
that policymakers interested in repealing the double tax should
pursue integration methods that provide the greatest flexibility for
adjustment and accommodation during the legislative process. Ultimately, however, politically viable integration may prove no more
attractive than the status quo.
I. HETEROGENEITY AND THE CORPORATE DOUBLE TAX
This Part argues that the heterogeneity of interests among managers, shareholders, and third parties grounds the persistence of
the corporate double tax. Section A sets out the mechanics of the
double tax, including the temporary relief enacted by Congress in
2003. Section B explains why the persistence of the double tax presents a puzzle to legal scholars and discusses the agency-cost explanation of that puzzle. Section C examines the pervasive heterogeneity of interests among managers, shareholders, and third
parties, and it argues that any approach to eliminating or mitigating
the corporate double tax will provoke both support and opposition
from within each of those groups.
A. The Mechanics of the Double Tax
The mechanics of the corporate double tax are reasonably
straightforward.21 The Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on the
“taxable income” of every corporation.22 A corporation’s “taxable
income” includes its income less certain deductions,23 such as the
ordinary and necessary expenses of conducting its business.24 The
corporation may be entitled to certain tax preferences (special tax
breaks subsidizing particular investments made by the corpora21

For a thoughtful discussion of the principles underlying the corporate double tax,
see generally Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay
in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 Yale L. J. 90 (1977).
22
I.R.C. § 11(a) (West 2008).
23
I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 63(a) (West 2008).
24
I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2008).
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tion), but the basic scheme taxes the corporation’s net business
profits at a flat rate of 35 percent.25 The corporation’s business
profits are taxed a second time when distributed to the corporation’s shareholders as a dividend.26 Assuming the dividend were
taxable as ordinary income, the tax rate paid by shareholders
would range from 10 percent (for lower-income shareholders) to 35
percent (for higher-income shareholders).27 To illustrate: if a corporation with one shareholder earns net business profits of $100 and
pays a corporate-level tax of $35, it will have $65 available for distribution as a dividend. If the shareholder is subject to the 35percent tax rate, she will pay $22.75 of tax on the $65 dividend, and
she will net $42.25 in after-tax profits.28 The $100 of distributed
business profits is taxed twice: once to the corporation and again to
the shareholder.29
The outcome would be different if the $100 were earned by a
non-corporate business. If the shareholder earned the $100 through
a sole proprietorship, she would pay a single level of tax at her 35percent rate, and she would net $65 in after-tax profits. Similarly, if
she earned the $100 through a partnership, she would pay a single
level of tax at her 35-percent rate and would net $65 in after-tax
profits. In either case, she would improve her after-tax return by
$22.75. The difference, of course, is simply the imposition of a single tax rather than a double tax. The non-corporate business profits
bear one level of tax at a 35-percent rate; the corporate business
profits bear two levels of tax at a combined 57.75-percent rate.
Congress enacted partial and temporary relief from the corporate double tax in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation

25
I.R.C. § 11(b) (West 2008). Although there is progressivity built into the rate
schedule, any corporation with at least moderate income (by corporate standards) is
taxed at a flat rate of 35 percent. Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 55.
26
I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1) (West 2008).
27
I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West 2008).
28
As discussed below, the shareholder generally would pay tax on the dividend at a
15-percent tax rate under temporary legislation enacted in 2003; the 35-percent rate is
used here for illustrative purposes.
29
If the corporation had not distributed its $65 after-tax profits to the shareholder as
a dividend, the value of the corporation’s shares would have increased by $65; the
shareholder would pay a shareholder-level tax on the $65 upon selling her shares.

DORAN_BOOK

526

4/15/2009 11:44 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:517

Act of 2003 (the “Jobs and Growth Act”).30 The Jobs and Growth
Act provided that most dividends would be taxed at capital gains
rates ranging from 0 percent (for lower-income shareholders) to 15
percent (for higher-income shareholders).31 The effect should be
readily apparent. If the corporation from the example above earns
$100 of net business profits, pays $35 of corporate income tax, and
distributes the remaining $65 as a dividend, the shareholder will
pay $9.75 of tax on the dividend (assuming the 15-percent tax rate).
This will leave her with $55.25 of after-tax profits—less than the
$65 available through a non-corporate investment but more than
the $42.25 available through the corporate investment when the
dividend is taxed as ordinary income. And, in fact, this result was
intended to stake out a middle position. The Jobs and Growth Act
was a compromise among President Bush, who wanted a complete
exclusion of dividends,32 the Senate, which would only pass a
scaled-back version of the dividend exclusion,33 and the House,
which would not agree to eliminate the shareholder-level tax.34
Apart from the relief under the Jobs and Growth Act, the tax
code provides other approaches for corporations and shareholders
to sidestep the double tax. The tax code includes numerous corporate tax preferences that shelter corporate income. Additionally, a
corporation can substitute debt financing for equity financing and
claim deductions that effectively remove the corporate-level tax on
business profits paid out as interest.35 Other mechanisms reduce or
eliminate the double tax at the shareholder level. A corporation
may redeem stock held by shareholders as a way of distributing
profits without paying dividends. The redemption, if treated as a
sale,36 allows shareholders to recover their basis in the redeemed
stock before including any portion of the proceeds in income.
30

Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, § 302,
117 Stat. 752, 758 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1).
31
Id. The lower rates apply to “qualified dividend income”—generally defined as
dividends received from domestic corporations and specific types of foreign corporations. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B) (West 2008).
32
Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 12; Press Release, The White House,
supra note 9; see also infra Part II.
33
S. 1054, 108th Cong. §201 (as passed by Senate, May 15, 2003).
34
H.R. 2, 108th Cong. §302 (as passed by House, May 9, 2003).
35
I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 2008).
36
The tax code treats certain redemptions (particularly those that are proportional
among shareholders) as dividends rather than as sales. I.R.C. § 302 (West 2008).
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Dividends received by shareholders that are exempt from tax, such
as charitable organizations and tax-qualified retirement plans, bear
no shareholder-level tax. Dividends received by shareholders that
are themselves corporations are covered by a dividends-received
deduction of up to 100 percent.37
Still, there are limits to how many tax preferences a corporation
can claim, how much debt it can issue, how many of its own shares
it can redeem, and how many of its shareholders are exempt from
tax or are also corporations. There are limits, in other words, to
how much the corporation and its shareholders can avoid double
taxation of the corporation’s distributed profits. The tax law must
therefore distinguish between those businesses treated as corporations and those treated otherwise. As a general proposition, any
business with interests that are publicly traded is classified as a
corporation and is subject to the corporate double tax; any other
business is classified as a non-corporate business and is not subject
to the double tax unless the owner or owners of the business elect
to treat the business as a corporation.38
37

I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008).
The path to this outcome is somewhat tortuous, but the result is clear. The tax
code defines a “corporation” to include an association, joint-stock company, and insurance company, and it defines a “partnership” to include a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, “or other unincorporated organization” that is not a trust, estate, or
corporation for tax purposes. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2), (3) (West 2008). The so-called
“check-the-box” regulations expressly provide that unincorporated businesses generally will be treated as partnerships (if there are two or more owners) or as disregarded
entities (if there is only a single owner). Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1), (2) (2008).
But see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)-(8) (2008) (providing corporate status for certain businesses even if not incorporated). The check-the-box regulations also provide,
however, that the owners of any partnership or disregarded entity can elect to treat
the business as a corporation for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2008). Although no election out of corporate status can be made by the owners of an incorporated business, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2008), there is no tax rule that requires the owners to incorporate the business in the first place. Hence, the rule is
genuinely elective through two distinct steps: first, by the decision whether to incorporate the business (if the business is incorporated, the double tax applies); and second, by a check-the-box election made for any unincorporated business (if an election
is made for an unincorporated business, the double tax applies). But cutting across the
check-the-box regulations is a statutory rule providing (with narrow exceptions) that
any publicly traded partnership will be treated as a corporation for tax purposes.
I.R.C. § 7704(a) (West 2008). Thus (ignoring the narrow exceptions), it is not possible
for a publicly traded business to avoid the double tax: it will either be a publicly
traded incorporated business, in which case the check-the-box regulations will pull it
38
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Thus, the corporate double tax is a mandatory outcome for all
publicly traded businesses—but only for publicly traded businesses.
If one assumes that investors prefer to avoid the double taxation of
business profits, one would expect that owners of privately held
businesses generally will structure those businesses to avoid being
treated as corporations for tax purposes.39 Whether it makes policy
sense or not, the corporate double tax serves as a toll charge imposed by the government on accessing capital through the securities markets. Equity investments made in businesses that are
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and similar
exchanges and markets bear heavier taxation than equity investments made in other businesses. Thus, all else equal, the cost of
capital to privately held businesses should be lower than that of
publicly held businesses, with the difference attributable to the
corporate double tax. The playing field is not level as to public and
private businesses but (at least at first glance) is level as to public
businesses. To the extent that public businesses compete with private businesses for equity capital, the double tax puts the public
businesses at a disadvantage; to the extent that public businesses
compete with each other for equity capital, the double tax (again,
at first glance) applies to all alike.
B. The Paradox of the Double Tax
The continuing existence of the corporate double tax is paradoxical. Both policymakers and academics generally agree that the
double tax results in significant distortions of economic and business decisions and argue for its repeal.40 The double tax plainly
into corporate status and the double tax; or it will be a publicly traded unincorporated
business, in which case the statute will pull it into corporate status and the double tax.
(Note that this discussion ignores any potential for status as an S corporation, which
effectively is not available for publicly traded businesses.).
39
The owner or owners of a privately held business might determine that there are
good tax reasons for electing into the corporate double tax. For example, the owner
or owners may be able to manage the taxable income of their business by paying more
or less of its profits out as deductible compensation, and they may be able to take advantage of the graduated rate structure applicable to corporations with comparatively
smaller taxable incomes. There also may be non-tax considerations that lead investors
to incorporate a privately held business.
40
On the government side, see The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System 60, 124–
25, 162 (2005) [hereinafter Advisory Panel Report]; Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra
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provides incentives for new investment through unincorporated
businesses, which distorts the allocation of capital across the corporate and non-corporate sectors.41 It encourages corporate financing
note 10, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, A Recommendation for Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems 2 (1992); U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Report
of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual and Corporate
Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (1992) [hereinafter Treasury Integration
Report]; The White House, The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 117, 120–29 (1985) [hereinafter, Treasury II]; U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, Volume
2: General Explanation of the Treasury Department Proposals 134–44 (1984) [hereinafter Treasury I]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Reform Option Papers Prepared by
Treasury Department on September 2, 1977 for the White House, 196 Daily Tax Rep.
49–53 (Supp. 1977)[hereinafter Treasury Option Papers]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 4–5, 68–75 (1977) [hereinafter Treasury Blueprints].
On the academic side, see, for example, Am. Law Inst., Federal Income Tax Project:
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes: Reporter’s Study of Corporate Tax Integration (Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Reporter) (1993) [hereinafter Warren
ALI Integration Study]; Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and PassThrough Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995);
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532 (1975); John
K. McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income Tax by Integration of the Corporate
Income Tax, 46 Tax Notes 1445 (1990); Fred W. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating
Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 39 Tax Law. 1 (1985); Scott A. Taylor,
Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 Va. Tax Rev. 237 (1990); Anthony P. Polito, Note, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1009 (1989). For criticisms of both the Treasury Integration Report and the Warren ALI Integration
Study, see Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully Not at
All): A Practitioner’s Comparison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 47
Tax L. Rev. 509 (1992). There have also been proposals to address the distortions of
the corporate double tax short of integration. See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Subchapter C
(Supplemental Study) (William D. Andrews, Reporter) (1989) [hereinafter Andrews
ALI Supplemental Study]; Am. Law Inst., Subchapter C: Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter’s Study on Corporate Distributions (William D. Andrews, Reporter) (1982) [hereinafter Andrews ALI Study]; George K.
Yin, A Different Approach to the Taxation of Corporate Distributions: Theory and
Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level Distributions Tax, 78 Geo. L.J. 1837
(1990); Ethan Yale, A Better Way to Tax Corporate Distributions: Allow Basis Recovery on Ordinary Dividends (Sept. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
41
Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 99; Treasury Integration Report, supra
note 40, at 3. One would expect that, in equilibrium, the pre-tax rate of return available through unincorporated businesses should fall and the pre-tax rate of return
through incorporated businesses should rise such that, all else equal, the after-tax
rates of return should be equivalent. Warren, supra note 7, at 725. Even then, how-
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through debt rather than equity, which increases the risk of corporate insolvency.42 The double tax also encourages the retention of
earnings in the corporation.43 Although this may facilitate longterm corporate investments,44 it may also decrease shareholder
monitoring of managerial investment decisions.45 Those distortions
probably reduce economic growth, making everyone worse off.46
Most (although not all47) academic commentators therefore have
agreed with the Treasury Department that Congress should integrate the corporate and individual income taxes.
At first, integration would appear generally to advance the interests both of corporations and shareholders. On the one hand,
repeal of the double tax should lower the cost of equity capital for
ever, one would expect that “the total amount of capital investment, as well as the
relative size of the corporate and non-corporate sectors, might not be optimal.” Id. at
737.
42
Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 81; Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40,
at 99–100.
43
Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 100; Treasury Integration Report, supra
note 40, at 13, 116–18.
44
Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 901.
45
See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 348.
46
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 111–12 (calculating the economic losses of the corporate double tax from $2.5 to $25 billion per year).
47
For arguments in favor of retaining the corporate double tax, see generally,
Chorvat, supra note 18; Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a
Flat Tax World?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965, 1081–99 (1989); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on “Integration” of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 Nat’l Tax
J. 335 (1975). Of course, not every defense of the corporate income tax is also a defense of the corporate double tax as it currently exists in the United States. See, e.g.,
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation,
77 Va. L. Rev. 211 (1991); Schlunk, supra note 18. Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that the
corporate income tax can be “justified as a means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193,
1244 (2004). He argues that such control cannot “be effectively achieved in a capitalist
economy by means other than a corporate tax imposed at a significant rate.” Id. at
1249. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, although AviYonah asserts that this justification lines up “more or less precisely [with] the current
scope of the tax we have today,” id. at 1245, it actually would justify a tax on any large
concentration of wealth—not just concentrations that issue shares on public exchanges and markets. Second, as the conditional tax-exempt status of tax-qualified
retirement plans and charitable organizations demonstrates, it is possible to exert substantial public control over private concentrations of wealth even with a zero-percent
tax rate. For an historical argument linking the corporate income tax to corporate
regulation, see generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53 (1990).

DORAN_BOOK

2009]

4/15/2009 11:44 AM

The Corporate Double Tax

531

corporations, allowing managers to finance a broader range of investment opportunities through new equity.48 Additionally, less reliance on debt financing should decrease the risk of corporate insolvency, which should also decrease the riskiness of manager
investments in their firm-specific human capital. On the other
hand, managers may prefer to finance corporate investments with
retained earnings rather than new equity investments, and the
double tax may facilitate that strategy through a lower tax burden
on undistributed corporate profits.49 Shareholders may also benefit
from integration if repeal of the double tax increases share values.50
Although no one knows the exact economic incidence of the corporate-level tax,51 integration may relieve shareholders of whatever
corporate-level taxes they actually bear.
If the double tax binds only businesses that are large enough and
sophisticated enough to issue publicly traded securities, why are
those businesses and their owners not powerful enough to force its
repeal? And why is the general consensus among policymakers and
academics favoring integration not adequate, with or without the
self-interested lobbying of corporations and shareholders? Explanations assuming that legislators wrongly conceive of the double
tax only as a burden on profit-mongering corporations and shareholders have little plausibility.52 Explanations that rely on the ob48

To the extent that integration were to cause investments to shift from noncorporate to corporate equity and thereby increase the cost of capital for noncorporate businesses, managers of non-corporate businesses might become more constrained in their own business investments.
49
See Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 939–42; Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 356–59.
50
The effect of integration on share values is not clear. See infra note 57.
51
See Pechman, supra note 8, at 141–46; Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax Revisited, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 303 (2008); Alan J. Auerbach,
Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005).
52
See, e.g., Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 331–33. For arguments against other explanations of the corporate tax, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 47, at 1197–212. Bank offers a different explanation for the corporate income tax. His account centers on capital lock-in, the legal power of corporate boards to refuse to release capital from the
corporation. Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 892–93. He argues that
the corporate income tax is a “pro-business compromise between the retained earnings penalty that could result from partnership or accrual-style taxation and the indefinite deferral that would result from having only a distributions tax.” Id. at 894.
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scure incidence of the corporate income tax similarly do not account for the failure of integration.53 It is more plausible that someone legislators care about—that is, some powerful or influential interest group—is either not pushing hard enough for integration or,
more likely, is pushing hard against it. The most prominent political explanation for the persistence of the corporate double tax is
the agency-cost explanation.54 That explanation attributes the “resilience” of the corporate double tax to “the separation between
ownership and control of large corporations.”55 Shareholders of
public companies “invariably” support tax changes that increase
the value of existing capital.56 Assuming that share values prior to
elimination of the double tax reflect the anticipated burden of the
double tax,57 integration would “confer windfalls on existing shareholders.”58 Integration would decrease the anticipated tax burden
on corporate profits, and that, all else equal, would cause share
values to rise.59 Shareholders, the explanation argues, therefore

Whether Bank is correct or not is beside the point for present purposes. Even if his
account is right, it only explains the existence of a corporate-level tax; it does not explain the corporate double tax. Any concerns about a “retained earnings penalty” and
“indefinite deferral” could be addressed with a corporate-level tax alone.
53
The intuition here is captured by the familiar aphorism of Senator Russell Long
(“Don’t tax you; don’t tax me; tax that man behind the tree.”). One might think that,
because the incidence of the corporate income tax is not entirely understood, neither
managers nor shareholders have clear incentives to lobby for its repeal. That explanation, however, falls short for two reasons. First, at best it explains only the persistence
of the corporate income tax; it does not account for the persistence of the corporate
double tax. Second, it does not account for the substantial resources that managers
commit to seeking corporate tax preferences that mitigate the effect of the corporatelevel tax.
54
See generally Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7.
55
Id. at 327.
56
Id. at 336.
57
That assumption—based on the “new view” that dividend taxes are capitalized
into share values—is controversial. See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, On the Marginal Source of Investment Funds, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 205 (2003);
George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend Taxation, 44
Nat’l Tax J. 497 (1991); see also Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 116–
18; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 33–39; Warren, supra note 7, at
753–54, 757.
58
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338.
59
Id. Of course, integration would also lower the tax burden on new equity, but that
lower burden would be capitalized into the value of the new equity at the time the investment is made. Id.
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support integration.60 Managers of public corporations, by contrast,
“are primarily concerned with stimulating new investment.”61 Tax
preferences such as accelerated depreciation for new machinery
enable managers “to expand their firms by increasing the after-tax
profitability of new investments.”62 That, in turn, raises manager returns on the human-capital investments they make in their companies.63 Corporate “[m]anagers therefore attach a low priority to integration, which provides a large windfall to existing capital, and
only a small stimulus to new investment.”64
The agency-cost explanation thus characterizes the conflict as
the result of managers and shareholders assigning different priorities to tax subsidies for existing investments and tax subsidies for
new investments.65 Shareholders, the explanation maintains, are not
hostile to subsidies for new investments;66 they simply prefer windfalls for their existing shares. Similarly, managers “prefer to lobby
for [corporate tax preferences] that may be less advantageous to
shareholders but are more cost-effective in stimulating investment.”67 Managers “do not actively oppose” integration,68 but they

60

Id. at 341.
Id. at 336.
62
Id. at 341. That assertion of the agency-cost explanation, although broadly accurate, overlooks the possibility that such tax preferences may benefit old capital as well
as new capital. Congress can extend new tax preferences to pre-enactment investments, thereby conferring windfall gains on corporations that have made past investments in whatever activities are covered by the new preferences. Additionally, even
tax preferences that are prospective only may subsidize past investments. For example, the enactment of favorable cost-recovery rules for new industrial factories and
equipment will increase the value of past decisions made by corporate managers to
begin or continue manufacturing operations. Thus, if Congress were to allow expensing of all machinery placed into service during the first two years after enactment,
there would be a large windfall to Boeing, Ford, and similar corporations.
63
Id. at 336, 341.
64
Id. at 336; see also id. at 342 (“Managers have testified in favor of integration, but
they have generally reserved their active lobbying efforts for tax preferences for new
investments . . . .”); id. at 344 (“Although managers have supported integration, they
have consistently preferred other measures that would reduce corporate sector
taxes.”).
65
Id. at 338.
66
Id. at 336 (“Shareholders . . . sometimes, but not always, support policies that
stimulate investment.”).
67
Id.
68
Id.
61
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“have chosen not to lobby vigorously for [it].”69 However, shareholders face collective-action problems and other obstacles to lobbying,70 and that leaves managers as “the only vocal public participants” in debates over integration proposals.71 Thus, “managerial
diffidence” is “the key to explaining the failure of integration efforts.”72
The agency-cost explanation recognizes that some managers
may take stronger positions supporting or opposing integration,
but it considers those managers to be outliers. Thus, “[a] few managers” of corporations that cannot take advantage of existing tax
preferences may support integration, but even these managers
would prefer the enactment of new preferences.73 Other managers
may actively oppose integration because the double tax facilitates
trapping earnings inside the corporation:74 the fact that the double
tax burdens distributed corporate earnings more than retained
earnings reduces shareholder demand for dividends and encourages managers to use retained earnings as a source for financing
corporate investments.75 Even so, the agency-cost explanation argues that only “[a] small group” of corporate managers actively resists integration by reason of this retained-earnings trap.76 The basic
story remains one of manager diffidence to integration.
There are, however, good reasons to doubt the agency-cost explanation. The explanation argues that the double tax creates a
wedge between the interests of shareholders, who generally prefer
integration to targeted tax preferences, and the interests of manag-

69

Id. at 327.
Id. at 363.
71
Id. at 328.
72
Id. at 327. Others had reached a similar conclusion before Arlen and Weiss published their analysis. See Robert J. Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 Tax Notes 889, 894–95 (1987); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration,
the Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 Tax Notes 637, 647 n.15 (1985).
73
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 342.
74
Id. at 348. Alternatively, some managers may oppose integration if they believe
that the revenue cost of eliminating the double tax will be offset by the elimination of
corporate tax preferences. Id. at 341, 347.
75
Id. at 348–61. Bank, however, argues that “[t]he notion that retained earnings became trapped in the corporation because of double taxation is a myth.” Steven A.
Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from History, 56 Tax L. Rev. 463, 466 (2003).
76
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 348.
70
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ers, who generally prefer targeted tax preferences to integration.
But that argument minimizes important differences among shareholders, among managers, and among the terms of different integration models. It also ignores entirely the interests of third parties
affected by integration. Although the agency-cost explanation acknowledges some heterogeneity among managers and among
shareholders, it does not consider heterogeneity to be the driving
force in the political economy of the double tax. Rather, the
agency-cost explanation centers on the divergence between the interests of managers as a group and the interests of shareholders as
a group. In other words, to the extent that the agency-cost explanation sees heterogeneity among the relevant interests, the explanation nonetheless fails to draw the right conclusions from it. At best,
the agency-cost explanation accounts for only one aspect of a considerably more complex and nuanced story about the political
economy of the corporate double tax.
C. Heterogeneity of Interests and Effects
The tax positions and interests of managers are heterogeneous;
so too are the tax positions and interests of shareholders. The double tax does not have uniform effects on corporations as a group or
on shareholders as a group, and the unevenness of the corporatelevel and shareholder-level taxes leaves certain managers and
shareholders better off under the status quo than other managers
and shareholders. Additionally, there are collateral interests on
both the manager side and the shareholder side that have economic stakes in the double tax.77 In many cases, those stakes consist
of selling investments that reduce or eliminate either the corporate-level or shareholder-level tax. This heterogeneity of interests
among managers, among shareholders, and among third parties
77

As used here, the term “collateral interest” generally refers to a party with an interest in the corporate double tax other than as a manager or shareholder. A party
will be referred to as a collateral interest on the manager side if the party’s interest in
the double tax relates primarily to the corporate-level tax, and a party will be referred
to as a collateral interest on the shareholder side if its interest in the double tax relates primarily to the shareholder-level tax. For example, a trade association representing alternative energy is a collateral interest on the manager side because corporate investments in alternative energy generally qualify for corporate tax preferences.
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makes it treacherous to generalize about policy preferences on
eliminating or mitigating the double tax. Additionally, integration
itself is not a monolith. Policymakers and academics have proposed
numerous integration models, and these models would have varying effects on different corporations, shareholders, and collateral
interests. Even if one reasonably assumes that all affected parties
would respond to integration legislation with rational self-interest,
mapping out their positions ex ante is not straightforward. The potential effects on manager, shareholder, and third-party interests
are sufficiently disparate to ensure that any proposal for integration will draw both political support and political opposition from
within each group.78
1. Managers and Collateral Interests
The corporate double tax creates several potential fault lines
among managers.79 First, many managers occupy a dual position:
they are both managers and shareholders. Managers often own
substantial equity stakes in their companies; in certain cases, directors set a minimum number of shares that managers must own. Although managers may buy shares on the open market, most of
their shares are provided as compensation. These include shares
granted outright, shares acquired through the exercise of stock options, and restricted shares in which the managers vest over time by
continuing in their positions. The equity interest of managers is
larger still once other stock-based compensation—such as “phantom” shares and unexercised stock options—are taken into account. Thus, if integration does create a windfall for existing stock
investments, managers with substantial shareholdings may be eager
to eliminate the double tax. Managers do not face the same collective-action problems that generally prevent other individual share-

78

For an early analysis of the interest-group effects of integration, including discussion about the heterogeneity of interests among managers and among shareholders,
see Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Stanley S. Surrey, Integration of Income Taxes: Issues
for Debate, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 169, 174–81 (1977).
79
See Cathie J. Martin, Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation 35 (1991) (“The most notable characteristic of the business community
in the United States is its high degree of fragmentation. . . . Fragmentation in the
business community means that no unambiguous class mandate for corporate taxation
is expressed.”).
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holders from lobbying; in fact, managers are uniquely positioned to
determine the lobbying positions of their corporations and to deploy substantial corporate resources in support of those positions.
But other managers—perhaps those with smaller shareholdings—
may not consider the prospect of a personal windfall as a reason
for positioning their companies in favor of integration; these managers might decide their corporations’ lobbying positions based on
their self-interest as managers rather than their self-interest as
shareholders.80
Even if managers ignore their own interests as shareholders,
they may adopt different stances on integration because their companies may have different tax burdens. The corporate-level tax sets
a deceptively simple baseline: corporate profits are taxed at a flat
35% rate. But this baseline exists only as an abstraction; the tax
code contains numerous corporate tax preferences of varying scope
and applicability that make the corporate-level tax as applied very
uneven. These preferences provide “a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction[,] a special [tax] credit, a preferential rate of tax,
or a deferral of tax liability”81 intended by Congress to encourage
certain types of corporate investments. Because they are limited to
particular industries, or even to particular corporations, they distribute unequal tax subsidies and create uneven tax burdens.
For example, current law provides a tax credit for engaging in
research and development activities82 and allows for the expensing
of certain research and experiment costs.83 These preferences are
worth over $9 billion each year to corporations that engage in such

80

In general, manager compensation has become more heavily concentrated in the
equity of their own companies since the middle of the 1990s. The effect of this development on the political economy of the double tax could not have been incorporated,
then, into the agency-cost explanation. To the extent, however, that managers held
significant shareholdings (whether or not of their own companies) prior to the middle
of the 1990s, managers occupied a dual position that could have been incorporated
into the agency-cost explanation.
81
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 § 3(3), 2 U.S.C. §
622 (2000). For the sake of simplicity, the discussion in this Subsection (I.C.1), concerning corporate tax preferences, ignores the effects of the corporate alternative
minimum tax.
82
I.R.C. § 41 (West 2008).
83
Id. § 174 (West 2008).
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activities (such as defense contractors),84 but they are useless to
corporations that do not (such as interstate bus companies). Corporations engaged in foreign activities benefit from a deferral of
active income from their controlled foreign corporations and other
preferences related to foreign activities. These preferences are
worth almost $20 billion to corporations having international business transactions, but nothing to corporations with purely domestic
activities.85 Numerous preferences for energy-related industries
provide corporate tax benefits worth about $6.5 billion;86 accelerated depreciation for machinery and business property confers
preferences of almost $20 billion;87 a special deduction for domestic
manufacturing and production is worth $7.4 billion;88 and an exclusion for federal subsidies paid to employers that provide a prescription-drug plan for Medicare-eligible employees is worth $1.1 billion.89 Insurance companies are entitled to various preferences that
sum to over $7 billion,90 and the construction industry enjoys,
among other preferences, a tax credit for developing low-income
housing worth $5.5 billion.91 The list, of course, goes on, providing
something like an honor roll for corporate lobbyists. The total
value of the various tax preferences for corporations engaged in
different industries and businesses in 2009 exceeds $118 billion92—
about 33% of the projected corporate income tax receipts for the
government’s current fiscal year.93 But, importantly, not all corpo-

84
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008–2012, at 60 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter Joint
Committee Tax Expenditures Estimates].
85
Id. at 60, 69. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation no longer classifies deferral for active income of controlled foreign corporations or deferral for active financing income as a tax expenditure. Id. at 69.
86
Id. at 60–63.
87
Id. at 69. Again, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation no longer classifies
this item as a tax expenditure. Id.
88
Id. at 66. See also Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 5.
89
Joint Committee Tax Expenditures Estimates, supra note 84, at 57.
90
Id. at 64–65.
91
Id. at 65.
92
Id. at 50–69.
93
Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to
2018, at 83 (2008) (projecting corporate income tax revenues of $356 billion for fiscal
year 2009).
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rations benefit equally. Each preference is limited by its terms to
corporations engaged in a particular industry or activity.94
Similarly, debt financing and tax shelters also create unevenness
in the corporate-level tax. Interest payments can be deducted for
corporate tax purposes, but different corporations rely differently
on debt financing,95 reflecting variance in creditworthiness and tolerance for insolvency risk. Those managers who are able and willing to borrow more heavily can effect greater reductions in their
corporate-level tax burden. Different managers also have different
propensities to enter into structured tax-avoidance transactions—
tax shelters—as a means for reducing the corporate-level tax burden.96
The unevenness resulting from the different use of corporate tax
preferences, interest deductions, and tax shelters shows up in effective tax rates and marginal effective tax rates. A study covering
large corporations in the years 2004 through 2006 found that effective tax rates, averaged over that three-year period, ranged from a
low of 10.2% to a high of 43.6%, with a median of 30%.97 Of the
eighty corporations included in the study, five had effective tax
rates under 20%, thirty-six had effective tax rates of at least 20%
but under 30%, thirty-six had effective tax rates of at least 30% but
under 40%, and three had effective tax rates of at least 40%.98 A
separate study covering the years 1995 to 2000 (which used a different methodology) found less extensive but still significant divergence among effective corporate tax rates.99
94

Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 2.
See, e.g., Pechman, supra note 8, at 184.
96
See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:
Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals (1999).
97
See Martin A. Sullivan, Reported Corporate Effective Tax Rates Down Since
Late 1990s, 118 Tax Notes 882, 885–86 (2008). An effective corporate tax rate is the
corporate tax expense divided by corporate pre-tax income. See George K. Yin, How
Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of
the S&P 500, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1793, 1795 (2003).
98
Sullivan, supra note 97, at 885–86.
99
Yin, supra note 97, at 1830–50 (finding that effective corporate tax rates ranged
from 25 to 30 percent). The variance in corporate effective tax rates has been the case
for some time. See Martin, supra note 79, at 1213 (reporting divergent effective corporate tax rates among different industries in 1980 and 1981). Arlen and Weiss also
note that “the incidence of preferences varies widely between corporations” and that
“[t]he uneven distribution of preferences means that different sectors face different
95
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Similarly, there is a broad range of marginal effective tax rates in
the corporate sector.100 As calculated by the Treasury Department
in 2007, the overall marginal effective tax rate for equity-financed
investments was 39.7%; the overall marginal effective tax rate for
debt-financed investments was negative 2.2%.101 As calculated by
the Congressional Budget Office in 2003, the marginal effective
corporate tax rate for equity-financed investment in industrial
structures was 41.0%, but the rate for equity-financed investment
in machinery was only 23.6%.102 By comparison, the marginal effective corporate tax rate for debt-financed investments in machinery
was negative 45.9%.103 And, as calculated by the Congressional
Budget Office in 2002, the marginal effective corporate tax rates on
other investments ranged from a low of 9.2% for “petroleum and
natural-gas structures” to a high of 36.9% for “computers and peripheral equipment”;104 the rate was 30.4% for commercial buildings, 22.7% for farm tractors, 20.1% for railroads, 17.8% for communications equipment, 16.7% for construction machinery, and
14.5% for aircraft.105
These differences in effective tax rates and marginal effective tax
rates are significant for managers’ decisions about whether and
how to lobby on integration. Because of differences in effective
rates, certain corporations “are granted full or partial relief from

effective tax rates.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 357. However, they regard the
variance in corporate tax rates as bearing primarily on the retained-earnings trap. Id.
at 357–59. In other words, they apparently do not consider the variance in corporate
effective tax rates as having significance in determining manager lobbying positions
on integration apart from the limited point that “a few” managers “oppose integration because of the retained earnings trap.” Id. at 358.
100
A marginal effective tax rate is “a hypothetical tax rate that, if applied to properly measured income, would have the same incentive effect as [that] implied by the
various . . . features of the actual tax code.” Treasury Background Paper, supra note
16, at 23.
101
Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 82.
102
Cong. Budget Office, Corporate Income Tax Rates: International Comparisons
35, 41 (2005); see also Martin, supra note 79, at 29 (“The corporate tax system skewed
investment from structures to equipment: income generated by structures is taxed at
roughly 30 percent; that of equipment, at approximately 20 percent.”).
103
Cong. Budget Office, supra note 102, at 44.
104
Cong. Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Rates and Approaches to
Reform 10–11 (2005) (providing 2002 data).
105
Id.
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corporate level tax”;106 others are not. All else equal, managers of
corporations with low tax burdens should not consider integration
to be as attractive as their counterparts at corporations with high
tax burdens. Indeed, managers at low-tax corporations may want to
resist integration if they anticipate that eliminating the double tax
would level the playing field in effective tax rates among corporations.107 The intuition here is straightforward. Because the double
tax generally applies to all corporations that issue equity in the
public securities markets, the managers of the corporations subject
to the double tax are competing with each other for investment
capital. This competition cuts across industries: a company in one
sector must compete for investment capital with a company in a
different sector, even though those two companies do not compete
with each other in the sale of their products and services.
In seeking investment capital, relative effective tax rates matter
a great deal because the relative effective tax rates affect the aftertax rates of return offered to investors. Managers of companies
with low effective tax rates enjoy lower costs of equity capital and,
as a result, greater opportunities for corporate expansion. Thus, it
is entirely rational for managers of low-tax corporations to prefer
the status quo—that is, to prefer the double taxation of corporate
profits—over any change to the double tax that would have the effect of leveling corporate effective tax rates. These managers rationally should prefer a system of double taxation that imposes
high relative tax rates on other corporations to a system of integration, even if the integrated system would reduce all corporate effective tax rates in absolute terms.108 Managers at high-tax corpora106

Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 4.
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 341 (“Corporate managers prefer to lobby on behalf of provisions that help only their firms or industries.”); see also Martin, supra
note 79, at 114–16 (providing examples of corporations lobbying for provisions that
benefit their firms or industries). Arlen and Weiss maintain that tax preferences such
as accelerated depreciation “can be targeted to specific industries” but that
“[i]ntegration affects all firms.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 341. The first point is
certainly valid: corporate tax preferences do affect different firms differently. But the
implication of the second point is the question at issue: indeed, it is in part because of
the uneven effects of corporate tax preferences that integration also affects firms differently.
108
See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 2, at 927 (“A tax can be beneficial to
some private producers if it strikes their competitors even harder.”).
107
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tions, of course, should have precisely the opposite disposition:
they should prefer a leveling of effective tax rates through integration to the continuation of uneven effective tax rates under the
status quo.109
The unevenness of the corporate-level tax affects collateral interests as well. A tax preference intended to induce a corporation
to make a particular type of investment often benefits the industry
in which the investment is made. The low-income housing tax
credit, for example, increases the aggregate amount invested in affordable housing and, by extension, benefits both the noncorporate construction firms that build the housing and the lowerincome families who live in it. Those collateral interests have a
stake in the corporate double tax even though they are neither
managers nor shareholders. Any repeal or reduction in the value of
a corporate tax preference—for example, through elimination of
the corporate-level tax—could significantly affect those collateral
interests. In certain cases, their stake in the continuation of corporate tax preferences may even be greater than that of managers: if
the incidence of corporate tax preferences shifts to third parties,
those third parties would bear the burden of losing those preferences. There is every reason to suppose that these collateral interests would participate actively in any integration proposal that
might strengthen or weaken corporate tax preferences.
2. Shareholders and Collateral Interests
The second level of the double tax also applies unevenly. Again,
the baseline is relatively straightforward. Any corporate profits distributed to shareholders as dividends are taxed to the shareholders.
Historically, ordinary-income rates applied; currently, capital-gains
rates apply. Any retained corporate profits remain untaxed until
shareholders sell their stock; at that point, capital-gains rates apply.
The tax law, however, creates substantial departures from this
baseline, including the complete elimination of the shareholderlevel tax for a large number of shareholders.
At least twenty-five percent of corporate equity is held by
shareholders that are exempt from federal income tax. As of the
109

See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 342 (noting that managers of corporations
with low use of corporate tax preferences may “actively support integration”).
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third quarter of 2008, the total value of outstanding corporate equity is $19.6 trillion.110 Of this, $3.8 trillion (19% of the total)111 is
held directly by private and government retirement plans; these
plans are completely exempt from tax.112 Mutual funds hold $4.1
trillion of corporate equity (21% of the total),113 and 25% of mutual
fund shares in turn are owned by private and government retirement plans.114 Another $97.4 billion of corporate equity (about
0.5% of the total),115 is held by state and local governments; these
also are exempt from tax. Thus, even without counting the corporate shares held by tax-exempt foundations, charities, universities,
and similar organizations, 25 out of every 100 dollars of corporate
equity is owned by shareholders who pay no income tax on dividends or on gains from the sale of their stock.116
A large amount of corporate equity is held by other corporations. Financial services companies (exclusive of mutual funds)
hold $1.45 trillion in corporate stock (about 7% of the total).117
Outside the financial services industry, many public companies
own stock in other companies, whether those other companies are
themselves publicly traded or are part of a controlled group of parent and subsidiaries. Dividends received by a corporation are subject to a 70% dividend-received deduction that effectively reduces
the tax rate on such dividends to 10.5%.118 The amount of the de110

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States: Flows and Outstandings Third Quarter 2008, at 90 tbl.L.213 (2008) [hereinafter Board of Governors]. This figure includes the value of stock in U.S. companies
held by foreign persons and the value of stock in foreign companies held by U.S. persons; it excludes inter-corporate holdings by companies outside the financial sector.
Id.
111
Id.
112
I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (West 2008).
113
Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213.
114
Id. at 90 tbl.L.214.
115
Id. at 90 tbl.L.213.
116
The 25% number is potentially several percentage points too low. See, e.g.,
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 67 (indicating that tax-exempt shareholders own approximately 37% of directly held corporate equity). One analysis concluded that in 2000 only 46% of corporate dividends were taxable at the shareholder
level. William G. Gale, About Half of Dividend Payments Do Not Face Double Taxation, 97 Tax Notes 839 (2002).
117
Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213.
118
I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008).
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duction increases for higher shareholdings: once the shareholding
corporation owns at least 80% of another corporation, the dividends-received deduction generally increases to 100%, eliminating
any shareholder-level tax on dividends.119 Finally, approximately
11% of the value of corporate equity is held by foreign investors.120
As a default rule, dividends received by foreign shareholders are
taxed at a flat withholding rate of 30%.121 However, this rate generally is lowered under bilateral tax treaties. For example, under the
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, dividends paid by U.S. companies to U.K. taxpayers generally are taxable by the U.S. at a rate of 15%.122
Ignoring foreign shareholders, the shareholder-level taxes on
corporate profits are as shown in Table 1. The first and second
rows in Table 1 cover corporate profits attributable to equity; the
third row, included for comparison, covers corporate profits attributable to debt. As Table 1 demonstrates, the second level of the
double tax on profits distributed as dividends actually applies only
in the case of a taxable non-corporate shareholder; for a taxexempt shareholder or a corporate shareholder, the second level of
the double tax on such profits is either eliminated or reduced.

119

Id. §§ 243, 1504(a) (West 2008). For 2004, only $51 billion of the $274 billion in
dividends received by corporate shareholders was subject to the double tax; the remaining $223 billion in dividends was covered by dividends-received deductions and
foreign tax credits. Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 78.
120
Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213.
121
I.R.C. § 871(a) (West 2008).
122
See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art.
10, § 2, July 24, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-19 (2002).
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Table 1
Investor-Level Taxes on Corporate Profits

Corporate Profit
Distributed as
Dividend
Corporate Profit
Realized on Stock
Sale
Corporate Profit
Distributed as Interest

Taxable
Non-Corporate
Investor
Taxable
(at Capital-Gains
Rate)
Taxable
(at Capital-Gains
Rate)
Taxable
(at Ordinary-Income
Rate)

Taxable
Corporate
Investor

Tax-Exempt
Investor

Deductible
(70% to 100%)

Not Taxable

Taxable

Not Taxable

Taxable

Not Taxable

The elimination and reduction of shareholder-level tax for taxexempt and corporate shareholders do not require that the distributing corporation have paid any corporate-level tax on the
amounts distributed. Thus, if a corporation earns income that is
covered by a corporate tax preference, such as a special exclusion
or deduction, and distributes that income as a dividend to a taxexempt or corporate shareholder, there may be no tax imposed at
either level. This is shown in Table 2, which sets out the combined
corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes on $100 of corporate
business profits. The first two rows show the results for profits distributed as dividends (the last two rows, which show the results for
profits distributed as interest, are included for comparison). If the
double tax were fully imposed on the $100, the corporate-level tax
would be $35, and the shareholder-level tax would be $9.75 ($22.75
in the case of a corporate shareholder) for a total tax of $44.75
($57.75 in the case of a corporate shareholder). Because of the
combination of corporate-level preferences and shareholder-level
exemptions and deductions, however, full double taxation actually
occurs only in the case of dividends paid out of non-preference income to taxable non-corporate shareholders. All other dividends
are taxed only once or not at all.
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Table 2
Combined Corporate-Level and Investor-Level Taxes on $100 of
Corporate Income
Taxable
Non-Corporate
Investor
Non-Preference Income
Distributed as Dividend
Preference Income
Distributed as Dividend
Non-Preference Income
Distributed as Interest
Preference Income
Distributed as Interest

Taxable
Corporate
Investor

Tax-Exempt
Investor

$44.75

$35

$35

$15

$0

$0

$35

$35

$0

$35

$35

$0

Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35%; individual tax rate for ordinary income is 35%; individual tax rate for capital gains is 15%; corporate tax preference provides for full exclusion or deduction; corporate shareholder entitled to 100% dividends-received deduction.

It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that double taxation
represents the norm in the taxation of corporate profits. Just as the
corporate-level tax is made uneven by corporate tax preferences,
interest deductions, and tax shelters, the shareholder-level tax is
made uneven by exemptions and dividends-received deductions.
This creates different, and potentially inconsistent, interests among
shareholders. There is little reason to suppose that all shareholders
would want the same outcome if integration legislation were in
play.
Additionally, there are important collateral interests on the
shareholder side that could be affected by the reduction or elimination of the double tax. For example, tax-qualified retirement plans
are themselves investment vehicles for employees. The tax-exempt
status of these plans allows employees to shelter income, including
corporate dividends, from the income tax: all else equal, an employee generally will have a higher post-tax return by holding dividend-paying corporate stock in a tax-qualified retirement plan
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rather than by holding it directly. But the advantage is relative; if
there were no shareholder-level tax on dividends paid by stock
held outside a plan, there would be no tax justification for holding
the stock inside the plan.123 The employee, moreover, is not the
only one who benefits from the arrangement: investment managers, trustees, actuaries, accountants, record-keepers, and other consultants receive fees from tax-qualified retirement plans and the
employers that sponsor the plans. In some cases—for example, a
pension plan actuary or record-keeper—the consultant’s entire
business consists of providing services to tax-qualified retirement
plans. Because the plan itself is effectively a tax shelter from the
individual income tax, including the shareholder-level tax on dividends, these consultants may have a strong interest in the continuation of the double tax. Similar considerations arise for third parties
such as life insurance companies, bond dealers, and realtors because of the relative tax advantages for investments in annuity contracts, tax-exempt bonds, and real estate.
By contrast, there are other collateral interests that may benefit
from eliminating the double tax. Certain brokerage firms, mutual
funds, and other investment firms, for example, would potentially
increase their business if individuals and other taxable investors
shift their portfolios toward corporate stock. These and other collateral interests on the shareholder side reasonably may see themselves as having stakes in integration that are important enough to
justify joining the lobbying fray.
3. Integration Models
Policymakers and academics have developed a remarkable variety of integration models.124 Under simplifying assumptions (includ123

See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Commentary, Will Integration Increase Efficiency?—
The Old and New View of Dividend Policy, 47 Tax L. Rev. 645, 646 (1992)
(“[I]ntegration might have a significant impact on tax-exempt organizations . . . particularly for the establishment of pension plans.”).
124
A note on terminology: the term “integration” (or “full integration”) is often
used to refer precisely to pass-through taxation of business income earned by corporations. See, e.g., Emil M. Sunley, Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective,
47 Tax L. Rev. 621, 624 (1992). The term is also used, however, to refer more broadly
to the elimination of the taxation of corporate profits distributed as dividends (“partial integration”). Id. To confuse matters a bit further, George Yin has suggested a
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ing equivalent corporate and shareholder tax rates), the models
produce equivalent outcomes,125 but they have widely differential
effects once relevant tax differences are taken into account. An
overview of several integration models grounds the basic equivalence:
A shareholder-allocation model attributes corporate income directly to shareholders. It preserves the corporate tax but gives
shareholders a credit for that tax.126 Shareholders increase basis in
their shares for the corporate income allocated to them, and they
treat corporate distributions first as a return of basis and then as
capital gains.
Example: Assume that the corporate and shareholder tax rates
are 35% and that Corporation X, which is owned entirely by
Shareholder Y, earns $100 of taxable income.127 Under the shareholder-allocation model, Corporation X pays $35 tax on the $100
income, and Shareholder Y is treated as having $100 of income.
Shareholder Y owes $35 of tax and claims a $35 credit for the tax
paid by Corporation X. If Corporation X later distributes $65 to
Shareholder Y, Shareholder Y excludes that $65 from income and
nets $65.
A mark-to-market model taxes shareholders on the sum of the
annual increase in the value of their shares and any dividends dismethod for achieving integration through double taxation. George K. Yin, Corporate
Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 Tax L. Rev. 431, 480–501
(1992). In this Article, the term “integration” is used in the broad sense to refer to the
elimination of the corporate double tax. Cf. Warren, supra note 7, at 739 (using the
term “integration” to refer “to the elimination of corporate taxes on distributed corporate earnings”).
125
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 61; cf. Warren, supra note 7, at
775–77 (demonstrating that the shareholder credit and dividend deduction integration
methods have equivalent effects).
126
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 27–29; Treasury Blueprints,
supra note 40, at 69; George F. Break & Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Reform:
The Impossible Dream? 101–03 (1975); Pechman, supra note 8, at 185–86 (describing
it as full integration or the “partnership method”); Dodge, supra note 40, at 279–81
(describing it as full integration or the “pass-through” model); Polito, supra note 40,
at 1030. It would also be possible to structure shareholder-allocation integration such
that no tax was collected at the corporate level. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 40, at
549–50; Yin, supra note 124, at 433–36. Prominent versions of the shareholderallocation model, however, would retain the corporate tax for purposes of collecting
the shareholder-level tax. See, e.g., Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 27.
127
Except where otherwise stated, these assumptions apply throughout the examples
discussed in the remainder of this overview.
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tributed to them.128 The model generally does not require a determination of corporate-level income, and it permits elimination of
the corporate-level tax.
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes nothing to
Shareholder Y. At the end of the year, the market value of the
Corporation X stock has increased by $100, and Shareholder Y includes that $100 in income. Shareholder Y pays $35 tax and adjusts
basis upward by $100. If Corporation X later distributes $100 to
Shareholder Y, Shareholder Y excludes the $100 from income and
(taking into account the $35 tax already paid by Shareholder Y)
nets $65.129
A dividend-deduction model leaves both the corporate-level and
shareholder-level taxes in place but gives the corporation a deduction for dividends paid to shareholders.130
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes the entire
amount as a dividend to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of
$0 ($100 income minus $100 deduction); Shareholder Y pays $35 of
tax and nets $65.
A split-rate model taxes distributed corporate income at a rate
lower than the rate for retained corporate income.131 If the rate for
distributed income is zero, the split-rate model is the same as the
dividend-deduction model.
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes the entire
amount as a dividend to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of
$0 ($100 of distributed income, taxable at a rate of 0%); Shareholder Y pays $35 of tax and nets $65.
A dividend-exclusion model preserves the corporate-level tax
but eliminates the shareholder-level tax for dividends.132
128

See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 47; Abrams & Doernberg,
supra note 3, at 11; Dodge, supra note 40, at 309–11; Taylor, supra note 40, at 298–
310.
129
This ignores the time value of money.
130
See Warren, supra note 7, at 745–46, 774; see also Treasury II, supra note 40, at
122 (proposing partial dividend deduction); Treasury I, supra note 40, at 136 (same);
Andrews ALI Supplemental Study, supra note 40, at 3, 88–89 (proposing deduction
for certain dividends on new equity); Andrews ALI Study, supra note 40, at 328, 366–
70 (same).
131
See Pechman, supra note 8, at 184; Warren, supra note 7, at 775.
132
See Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 124–25; Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 17–18; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 47;
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Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays $35 in tax and distributes $65 to Shareholder Y. Shareholder Y excludes the $65
from gross income and nets $65.
An imputation-credit model preserves the corporate-level tax but
converts it to a withholding mechanism for the shareholder-level
tax.133 The includable amount of any dividend is increased
(“grossed up”) by the corporate-level tax attributable to the
amount distributed; the shareholders claim a credit for the corporate-level tax.
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of $35 and distributes $65. Shareholder Y includes $100 in gross income (the $65
actually distributed and a $35 gross up), owes $35 tax on the distribution, and claims a $35 credit. Shareholder Y nets $65.
A comprehensive business income tax model eliminates the tax
distinction between corporate and non-corporate businesses.134
Every business pays an entity-level tax on its taxable income, which
generally is calculated in the same manner as corporate taxable income but without any deduction for interest payments. Shareholders and creditors exclude all distributions, whether characterized as
dividends or interest.135
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of $35 and distributes $65. Shareholder Y excludes the $65 distribution from income and nets $65.
Table 3 summarizes the equivalent effects of these integration
models under simplified assumptions. As the table indicates, each
model yields combined corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes

Break & Pechman, supra note 126, at 97–98; Pechman, supra note 8, at 184–85; Peel,
supra note 40, at 13–14.
133
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 95; Treasury Option Papers,
supra note 40, at 49–50; Break & Pechman, supra note 126, at 99–100; Pechman, supra
note 8, at 184; Warren, supra note 7, at 744–45, 773–74.
134
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 39–40; cf. Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 162 (proposing a “flat 30 percent tax on all businesses other
than sole proprietorships, regardless of their legal structure”).
135
In this way, the comprehensive business income tax would not simply integrate
the corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes, it also would fundamentally alter the
tax treatment of non-corporate businesses.
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of $35 on business income of $100, netting $65 for the shareholder.
This compares to combined taxes of $57.75 and a net of $42.25 under the corporate double tax for non-corporate shareholders receiving a dividend from $100 of corporate earnings not subject to
any tax preferences. Although important as a baseline, this equivalence among the integration models is misleading, and it breaks
down once the analysis accounts for relevant tax differences among
corporations and among shareholders.
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Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35% (but 0% under shareholderallocation and mark-to-market methods and for income distributed as dividends under split-rate method); individual tax rate is 35%; no portion of the
$100 constitutes preference income. Additionally, both the time value of
money and any benefits of deferring dividends are ignored.

a. Differential Effects at the Corporate Level
Integration models have differing effects on high-tax and low-tax
corporations. As explained above, variance in corporate effective
tax rates follows from different utilizations of corporate tax preferences, debt financing, and tax shelters. Certain integration models
narrow that variance, but others do not. Managers of low-tax corporations rationally may support integration proposals that would
not even out effective tax rates but oppose integration proposals
that would; managers of high-tax corporations rationally may line
up the other way.
Consider how different integration models would affect corporate tax preferences, a principal source of unevenness in corporate
effective tax rates. The basic question here is whether integration
should pass the benefit of a corporate tax preference through to
shareholders. Perfectly sound policy arguments have been made on
both sides. If the object of integration is to treat shareholders as
though they had earned the corporation’s business income directly,
preferences should pass through;136 if instead the object is to tax
corporate business profits exactly once, preferences should not
pass through.137 The point could even be resolved on a preferenceby-preference basis.138
Different integration models imply different outcomes for corporate tax preferences. The dividend-deduction model does not

136

Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 59; Warren, supra note 7, at
777–78.
137
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 64; Warren ALI Integration Study,
supra note 40, at 60; Warren, supra note 7, at 778.
138
See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 63–64, 108–12. For a discussion of how other tax systems have addressed the problem of tax preferences and integration, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate Preference Items under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis, 44 Tax Law.
195 (1990).
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pass through preferences.139 By contrast, the shareholder-allocation
integration model strongly implies that pass-through is appropriate
because the model is premised on the idea that shareholders
should be treated as standing in the place of the corporation.140 The
mark-to-market model—which is conceptually similar to the
shareholder-allocation model—eliminates the need to calculate
taxable income at the corporate level. In turn, that eliminates the
calculation of corporate tax preferences.141 Other models are more
flexible. Allowing shareholders to exclude all dividends under the
dividend-exclusion model passes corporate-level tax preferences
through to shareholders;142 not allowing an exclusion for dividends
attributable to income not taxed at the corporate level has the opposite effect.143
Table 4 illustrates the significance of the pass-through question.
Under the double tax, a corporation with $100 of business profits
that can be excluded at the corporate level by reason of a tax preference pays no corporate-level tax; the corporation distributes the
entire $100 to its shareholder who nets $65 after paying the shareholder-level tax of $35 (see Column B). By contrast, a corporation
with $100 of non-preference (fully taxable) income distributes an
after-tax amount of only $65, netting $42.25 to the shareholder (see
Column A). The corporation with preference income provides a
higher after-tax return to its shareholder than does the corporation
with non-preference income. That advantage is maintained under
139

Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 186.
Id. at 30. Also, it might not even be practicable under this model not to pass preferences through. In the Treasury Integration Report, the Treasury Department noted
that attempts to prevent pass-through of preferences under this method were “difficult and inconsistent with the passthrough nature” of shareholder allocation. Id.
141
Dodge, supra note 40, at 303–04. Although it would be possible under the markto-market model to track corporate taxable income so that preferences could be
passed through to shareholders, doing so would leave little reason to consider the
model as a distinct form of integration.
142
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 17–19, 64, 186. Thus, if a corporation earns $100 of profits that it can exclude from its income by reason of a tax
preference and then distributes that $100 to its shareholders, exclusion of the $100
dividend by the shareholders results in no taxation of those profits at either the corporate or shareholder level.
143
The imputation-credit method also can be used to pass through, or not pass
through, tax preferences. See Warren, supra note 7, at 778–84; Treasury Option Papers, supra note 40, at 49 (describing proposal for imputation-credit integration that
would pass investment tax credit through to shareholders).
140
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integration (shown in Table 4 using the dividend-exclusion
method) as long as preferences are passed through. With passthrough, the corporation with $100 of preference income returns a
net of $100 to its shareholder (see Column D), but the corporation
with no preference income returns a net of only $65 to its shareholder (see Column C). Without pass-through, both corporations
return only $65 to their shareholders (see Columns F and E). Thus,
passing preferences through under integration preserves the relative advantage of the corporation with preference income; that
corporation continues to provide a higher rate of return to its
shareholder than a corporation with non-preference income and,
accordingly, continues to benefit from a lower cost of capital. Not
passing preferences through fundamentally alters the relative positions of the two corporations.

DORAN_BOOK

4/15/2009 11:44 AM

556

[Vol. 95:517

Virginia Law Review

Table 4
Effects of Pass-Through of Corporate Tax Preferences
A

B

C

D

E

F

Double
Tax
(Current
Law)

Double
Tax
(Current
Law)

Dividend
Exclusion

Dividend
Exclusion

Dividend
Exclusion

Dividend
Exclusion

Corporation with
No Preference
Income

Corporation with
Preference Income

PassThrough
Corporation with
No
Preference
Income

PassThrough
Corporation with
Preference
Income

No PassThrough
Corporation with
No
Preference
Income

No PassThrough
Corporation with
Preference
Income

0

100

0

100

0

100

100

0

100

0

100

0

35

0

35

0

35

0

65

100

65

100

65

100

Shareholder
Income

65

100

0

0

0

100

Shareholder
Tax

22.75

35

0

0

0

35

57.75

35

35

0

35

35

42.25

65

65

100

65

65

Corporate
Income
(Preference)
Corporate
Tax
(NonPreference)
Corporate
Tax
Dividend

Total Taxes
Net to
Shareholder

Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35%; individual tax rate is 35%; preference income is entirely excludable; all shareholders are individuals.

The treatment of tax preferences under integration should present a genuine concern for managers. All else equal, corporations
with greater utilization of corporate tax preferences have lower effective tax rates; all else equal, corporations with lower effective
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tax rates have lower costs of capital. Passing through corporate tax
preferences under integration maintains these uneven results; that
should make integration attractive to managers of low-tax corporations and unattractive to managers of high-tax corporations. Not
passing preferences through evens out the results; that should appeal to managers of high-tax corporations (especially to those who
have tried unsuccessfully to secure tax preferences through the legislative process) but not to managers of low-tax corporations. If a
particular legislative proposal were pre-committed on the passthrough question—for example, if it were a proposal under the
shareholder-allocation model, which automatically passes preferences through to shareholders—that point alone might divide
managers. If instead the proposal put the pass-through question in
play—for example, if it were a proposal under the imputationcredit model, which readily accommodates passing or not passing
preferences through to shareholders—the lobbying decisions of
managers might be more complex and might lead to contingent
support or opposition. It is not plausible, however, that managers
of corporations that are relative winners or losers under the corporate double tax would be indifferent to how integration would affect their effective tax rates relative to the effective tax rates of
other companies with which they must compete for equity capital.
As the agency-cost explanation argues, different managers may
have different dispositions toward the retained-earnings trap. Although the various integration models generally would remove the
trap, certain models would simply remove the bias in favor of retaining earnings while others would create a new bias in favor of
distributing earnings. The latter possibility is particularly likely in
the case of models that condition integration on the distribution of
earnings, such as the dividend-deduction, split-rate, dividendexclusion, and imputation-credit models. By contrast, the shareholder-allocation and mark-to-market models would eliminate the
double tax without regard to whether the corporation distributes
profits. This difference potentially splits the interests of managers:
the managers of corporations that pay regular dividends should
prefer the distribution-dependent models over the other models;
managers of corporations that retain their profits should (as the
agency-cost explanation argues) oppose integration or, perhaps as
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a fallback, support integration only if it does not require distributions. To complicate the issue, the distribution-dependent integration models generally can be modified to extend the benefits of integration to retained earnings through a dividend reinvestment
plan (“DRIP”).144 In the case of the dividend-exclusion model, for
example, a DRIP would allow the shareholder of a corporation
that retains its earnings to increase her basis, thereby reducing her
gain when she sells her stock.145 That removes the bias in favor of
distributing earnings, although it does not restore the bias in favor
of retaining earnings. Thus, the different integration models—and
variations on the different integration models—likely will appeal
differently to managers of corporations that distribute earnings and
managers of corporations that retain earnings.
In combination, these considerations may present managers with
complex decisions about whether to lobby on a particular integration proposal and, if so, what position to take. The anticipated consequences for effective tax rates, the treatment of corporate tax
preferences, and the possibility of a bias for the distribution of
earnings should be of concern to managers, but those factors may
differ significantly from one specific proposal to another and,
within the four corners of any one proposal, may be subject to
modification during the legislative process. No doubt, managers
must also consider the likely responses of other managers. If a
manager of a low-tax, earnings-retaining corporation generally
would prefer that there not be integration, her decision about
whether or how to lobby may be affected by her expectations
about the lobbying decisions of managers at high-tax, dividendpaying companies.
Finally, different integration models would also have different
effects on manager-side collateral interests; that, in turn, could
cause such collateral interests to support integration under certain
models but to oppose it under others. Consider, for example, a collateral interest (such as a trade association for producers of alternative energy) that sells goods or services to corporations for which
the corporations can claim a tax credit (such as a credit for invest-

144

Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 24, 87–88; see also Warren ALI
Integration Study, supra note 40, at 116–17 (describing constructive dividend options).
145
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 83, 87–88.
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ments in alternative energy). It should matter greatly to that collateral interest whether the terms of a particular integration proposal
preserve the value of the corporate-level credit. Integration under
the mark-to-market model eliminates the calculation of corporatelevel taxes and thus nullifies the value of the credit. The collateral
interest should strongly oppose mark-to-market integration. By
contrast, the shareholder-allocation model passes corporate tax
preferences through to shareholders, allowing shareholders to
claim those preferences directly for tax purposes. The collateral interest should strongly support integration on these terms. Depending on policy decisions, other models—such as the imputationcredit model—may pass corporate tax preferences through, and, if
they do, may pass them through in whole or only in part. The lobbying decision of the collateral interest plainly should include the
effect that the particular integration proposal would have on the
credit.
b. Differential Effects at the Shareholder Level
Different integration models also have different effects at the
shareholder level. The most prominent example is the treatment of
shareholders that are exempt from federal income tax. Because
tax-exempt shareholders own at least 25% of outstanding corporate equity,146 they may have a strong desire to lobby on integration. For these shareholders, there are two relevant considerations:
whether a particular integration proposal would increase or decrease the absolute tax burden on their stock investments; and
whether a particular integration proposal would increase or decrease that tax burden relative to the tax burden on stock investments made by taxable shareholders.
Table 5 illustrates these points. Corporate non-preference income distributed to tax-exempt shareholders currently bears only
the corporate-level tax, and corporate preference income distributed to tax-exempt shareholders currently bears no tax at all (see
Column A). By contrast, corporate non-preference income distributed to taxable shareholders currently bears the double tax, and
corporate preference income distributed to taxable shareholders
146

See supra Subsection I.C.2.
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currently bears the shareholder-level tax (see Column B). An integration model that eliminates the corporate-level tax—such as the
dividend-deduction model—eliminates altogether the tax burden
for dividends paid to tax-exempt shareholders when corporate
non-preference income is distributed to these shareholders (see
Column C).147 However, the elimination of the corporate-level tax
leaves unchanged the position of tax-exempt shareholders relative
to the position of taxable shareholders (see Column D).148 All else
equal, tax-exempt shareholders could be expected to favor integration on those terms because it would leave those shareholders no
worse off on either an absolute or a relative basis.
By contrast, an integration model that eliminates the shareholder-level tax—such as the dividend-exclusion method—makes
tax-exempt shareholders worse off relative to taxable shareholders.
Removal of the shareholder-level tax does not change the absolute
treatment of tax-exempt shareholders (compare Column E to Column A).149 It does, however, improve the treatment of taxable
shareholders relative to the double tax (compare Column F to
Column B). Therefore, it also improves the treatment of taxable
shareholders relative to tax-exempt shareholders.150 Many taxexempt shareholders, such as tax-qualified retirement plans and
variable annuities sold by life insurance companies, are themselves
investment vehicles for taxable shareholders. Undoing the relative
tax advantage for these tax-exempt shareholders may impair their
ability to attract and retain investments. All else equal, these taxexempt shareholders could be expected to oppose integration under models that remove the shareholder-level tax, just as they
could be expected to support integration that removes the corporate-level tax.151

147
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 70, 107, 186–87; Warren ALI
Integration Study, supra note 40, at 161; Warren, supra note 7, at 774, 787–88.
148
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 187.
149
Id. at 17, 70, 186.
150
See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 161–62.
151
The agency-cost explanation argues that removing the shareholder-tax provides
“little benefit” to tax-exempt shareholders. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 363–64
n.155. But that does not really capture the effect from the perspective of these shareholders: it is not simply that eliminating the shareholder-level tax leaves their absolute
tax position unchanged, it is that eliminating the shareholder-level tax makes their
relative tax position considerably worse.
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Table 5
Comparison of Tax-Exempt and Taxable Shareholders under
Double Tax and Integration

Business
Profits Not
Subject to
Corporate
Tax
Preference
Business
Profits
Subject to
Corporate
Tax
Preference

A

B

C

D

E

F

Double Tax

Double Tax

Dividend
Deduction

Dividend
Deduction

Dividend
Exclusion

Dividend
Exclusion

TaxExempt
Shareholder

Taxable
Shareholder

Tax-Exempt
Shareholder

Taxable
Shareholder

Tax-Exempt
Shareholder

Taxable
Shareholder

CorporateLevel Tax

Double Tax

No Tax

ShareholderLevel Tax

CorporateLevel Tax

CorporateLevel Tax

No Tax

ShareholderLevel Tax

No Tax

ShareholderLevel Tax

No Tax

ShareholderLevel Tax

Assumptions: Preference income is entirely excludable; preferences do not
pass through to shareholders; all shareholders are individuals.

Under other integration models, the outcomes for tax-exempt
shareholders depend on a further policy decision about whether to
make shareholder-level credits fully or partially refundable. Both
the shareholder-allocation and the imputation-credit models, for
example, retain the corporate-level tax but give shareholders a
credit for the taxes paid by the corporation. Tax-exempt shareholders benefit from the credit only if it is refundable. A fully refundable credit under these models replicates the effects of eliminating the corporate-level tax: dividends paid to taxable
shareholders bear the corporate-level tax, but dividends paid to
tax-exempt shareholders bear neither the corporate-level nor
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shareholder-level tax.152 A nonrefundable credit replicates the effects of eliminating the shareholder-level tax: dividends paid to
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders both bear the corporate-level
tax.153 Partially refundable credits produce results between these
extremes. The interests and lobbying positions of tax-exempt
shareholders under these types of integration models should be
strongly affected by the prospects that the shareholder-level credit
will be made refundable in whole or in part.
The same point can be generalized for rate differences among
taxable shareholders.154 Individual shareholders pay tax at different
tax rates, and their tax rates need not line up with the corporate tax
rate. The variance in tax rates implies that different integration
models produce different outcomes among individual shareholders.
Integration models that eliminate the corporate-level tax subject
corporate profits to the various shareholder rates, whereas integration models that eliminate the shareholder-level tax subject corporate profits to the uniform corporate rate.155 And integration models that convert the corporate-level tax into a withholding
mechanism for the shareholder-level tax subject corporate profits
either to shareholder rates if the shareholder-level credit is refundable or to the corporate rate if the credit is nonrefundable.156 This
implies that different individual shareholders may take different
positions on integration. Higher-income shareholders may prefer,
all else equal, the elimination of the shareholder-level tax when (as
has ordinarily been the case but is not the case now) individual
rates exceed the corporate rate. Lower-income shareholders may
prefer, all else equal, the elimination of the corporate-level tax; in
this respect, the interests of lower-income shareholders should
align with those of tax-exempt shareholders.157

152

Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 93, 187.
Id. at 93, 95, 103, 187; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 164–66;
Warren, supra note 7, at 774.
154
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 185–86.
155
See id. at 185; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 10.
156
See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 185–86.
157
Although different integration models may also have differential effects on foreign shareholders, it seems unlikely that such shareholders generally would wield substantial lobbying influence in Congress. It may be, however, that integration models
that subject corporate business profits to taxation at shareholder rates would reduce
the use of corporate tax shelters. See generally Mark P. Gergen, How Corporate In153
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Different integration models also may affect collateral interests
on the shareholder side differently. Consider two trade associations: one that represents service providers for tax-qualified retirement plans and one that represents brokerage firms. A proposal for integration that eliminates the shareholder-level tax—
such as the dividend-exclusion model—could be expected to cause
individuals to shift investments away from tax-qualified plans. That
should draw the opposition of the trade association representing
plan service providers and the support of the trade association representing brokerage firms. By contrast, an integration proposal
that eliminates the corporate-level tax without affecting the shareholder-level tax might not draw the strong support or opposition of
either trade association.
c. Differential Transition Effects
Legislative proposals to integrate the corporate and individual
income taxes present transition issues, and the resolution of those
issues may have varied effects on different managers, different
shareholders, and different collateral interests.158 The agency-cost
explanation generally assumes that integration would apply to all
corporate equity, producing a windfall increase in the value of
shares held at the time of enactment.159 But that assumes away
much of the complexity that transition issues present in the tax legislative process.
It is certainly possible that integration legislation would not
grandfather stock investments made before enactment, thereby

tegration Could Kill the Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, 61 Tax L. Rev. 145
(2008).
158
See generally Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 89–92; Daniel
Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity 158–70 (2000) (analysis of potential transition issues under corporate integration).
159
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338. There are, of course, other possible transition effects. Holders of other financial instruments—such as corporate bonds—may
suffer a windfall loss if investors respond to integration by selling bonds in order to
buy stock. McLure & Surrey, supra note 78, at 178. And holders of stock in corporations that make extensive use of tax preferences may suffer a windfall loss if integration does not pass corporate tax preferences through to shareholders. Warren, supra
note 7, at 778.
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conferring the potential windfall transition gain that the agencycost explanation assumes.160 That outcome, however, is not inevitable. If integration were to grandfather existing stock investments,
shareholders would not experience any windfall gain.161 Alternatively, integration could include a one-time tax on any windfall
gains.162 That may encourage managers to favor integration and
shareholders to be indifferent to integration (assuming this part of
the agency-cost explanation were otherwise correct). And, of
course, the plasticity of transition treatment allows legislators to
buy off manager or shareholder interests otherwise opposed to integration. For example, an integration proposal that provokes opposition from tax-exempt shareholders because it eliminates the
shareholder-level tax might become more attractive (or at least less
objectionable) to those shareholders if they were promised a substantial windfall transition gain. Or the absence of a windfall transition gain for taxable shareholders might be softened, for example,
by a decision to pass corporate tax preferences through to them.
Similar adjustments could make integration more or less appealing
to managers as well.
The transition issues are still more nuanced. Congress often
mitigates transition gains and transition losses by delaying new
rules, phasing them in over time, or grandfathering only select investments held by specified taxpayers.163 Any combination of those
policy instruments would be available for integration legislation.
160

See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 205–07. An effective date
that does not distinguish between existing stock investments and new investments
may cause the market value of existing investments to increase if the pre-enactment
market value of the investments incorporates a discount for the double tax. As indicated above, however, there is debate on that point. Thus, whether there would be
such windfall transition gains and, if so, how large those gains would be, remains uncertain. See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 223 n.2.
161
See Andrews ALI Supplemental Study, supra note 40, at 89–97. Cf. Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 90 (considering and rejecting grandfathering of
existing stock investments as mechanism for eliminating windfall transition gains).
162
See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash
Flows, in Debt, Taxes, and Corporate Restructuring 91, 115 (John B. Shoven & Joel
Waldfogel eds., 1990).
163
Shaviro, supra note 158, at 216–17; see also Treasury Integration Report, supra
note 40, at 90 (recommending phase-in for integration in general and describing
phase-in for the dividend-exclusion model); Warren ALI Integration Study, supra
note 40, at 209–11 (recommending and describing phase-in for the imputation-credit
model).
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Congress could give tailored transition gains and losses to particular interests: it might, for example, want to allow the pass-through
of certain tax preferences held by some corporations but deny
pass-through in all other cases; it might want to give a windfall gain
to existing investments held by certain taxable shareholders but not
to existing investments held by other taxable shareholders or by
tax-exempt shareholders; or it might want to treat all owners of existing investments the same but allow only a partial windfall in all
cases. The precise terms of the transition treatment under integration are, if anything, more likely to be determined by the lobbying
positions of affected parties than they are to be determinants of
those positions. Legislators who favor or oppose integration will
use transition relief as currency for buying and selling support for
the legislation.164
In short, one cannot assume that straightforward and predetermined transition effects will drive the lobbying positions of either
managers or shareholders on integration. It may be that integration
legislation would confer windfall gains on shareholders with existing stock investments, but grandfathering and other transition
mechanisms could eliminate or reduce those gains. Congress can
calibrate transition gains and losses with considerable precision, effectively hand-picking transition winners and losers in order to secure support for pending integration legislation. Most importantly,
the anticipated transition effects may be markedly uneven among
managers, among shareholders, and among collateral interests, resulting in various lobbying positions within these groups.
II. EVIDENCE FROM THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S DIVIDENDEXCLUSION PROPOSAL
The recent effort by President George W. Bush to integrate the
corporate and individual income taxes illustrates how the heterogeneous interests of managers, shareholders, and third parties contribute to the stubborn persistence of the corporate double tax. In
2003, President Bush proposed integration under the dividend164

See, e.g., Martin, supra note 79, at 94 (describing a change to the effective date of
suspension of investment tax credit made specifically to accommodate Trans World
Airlines).
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exclusion model. The proposal set off furious lobbying activity
among potential winners and losers, and Congress ultimately rejected outright integration in favor of reducing the tax rate on dividends.165 Consistent with the heterogeneity analysis outlined above,
managers divided sharply on the proposal; so too did shareholders.
Additionally, the proposal elicited both support and opposition
from collateral interests that had much to win or lose under the
specific integration terms setting out the dividend exclusion. In
short, the evidence from the Bush administration’s dividendexclusion proposal reveals a complex and nuanced story of political
interests and political positioning, with certain managers, shareholders, and third parties giving strong support and other managers, shareholders, and third parties presenting strong opposition.
The complex interests put into play by the proposal simply cannot
be reduced to a single dimension (such as a divergence between
manager interests and shareholder interests, as suggested by the
agency-cost explanation).166
A. The Divided-Exclusion Proposal
The Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal was a
reasonably straightforward integration plan.167 President Bush announced the proposal in early January 2003168 and he submitted it
to Congress in February 2003169 with a pledge that the proposal
would tax corporate profits “once and only once.”170 The proposal
included two mechanisms for eliminating the shareholder-level tax
165

As described in Section I.A, supra, the Jobs and Growth Act made dividends
generally taxable at (lower) capital-gains rates rather than (higher) ordinary-income
rates; the capital-gains rates apply through 2010.
166
The author was an attorney in the Office of Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury Department throughout the pendency of the dividend-exclusion proposal. The analysis
of the political activity described in this Part (II) is based on documents in the public
record, interviews with former government officials in the executive and legislative
branches, and the author’s own experience with the dividend-exclusion proposal and
the lobbying positions that it generated.
167
The description of the proposal set forth here omits certain technical details. For
a full description, see Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 11–22, and Staff of
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 108th Cong., Description of Revenue Provisions Contained
in the President’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Proposal 18–33 (Comm. Print 2003).
168
Press Release, The White House, supra note 9.
169
See Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 11–22.
170
Id. at 12.
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on corporate profits: a shareholder dividend exclusion for distributed profits, and a shareholder basis adjustment for retained profits. Any corporate profits taxed at the corporate level and then distributed as dividends would be excludable from shareholder
income.171 For example, a corporation that earned $100 of taxable
income and paid $35 in tax could distribute $65 to its shareholders
as an excludable dividend.172 Any corporate profits taxed at the
corporate level and then retained by the corporation would increase the shareholders’ basis in their stock; that, in turn, would
decrease any taxable gain realized by the shareholders upon sale of
the stock.173 For example, the shareholders of a corporation that
earned $100 of taxable income, paid $35 in tax, and retained the
$65 after-tax amount would increase their stock basis by $65. On a
subsequent sale of their stock, the basis increase would reduce the
shareholders’ taxable gain by $65.174 This basis adjustment effectively would allow a corporation’s shareholders to obtain a tax
benefit for the retained earnings.175
Several features of the proposal deserve note. First, because the
proposal did not condition integration on the actual distribution of
corporate profits, it would have removed the bias in favor of retaining profits without creating a bias in favor of distributing profits. Second, the proposal did condition integration on the payment
of corporate-level tax: shareholders of a corporation that successfully sheltered its profits from corporate-level tax would get neither
a dividend exclusion nor a basis adjustment for the sheltered profits. Third, the proposal potentially reduced the value of corporate
171

Id.
The proposal required each corporation to track an “excludable dividend
amount” (“EDA”) to determine the portion of its profits for a year that had been
taxed and, as such, could be distributed to shareholders tax-free. Id. at 12–14.
173
Id. at 12, 19.
174
Any EDA not distributed to shareholders during a year would be credited to the
corporation’s “retained earnings basis adjustments.” Id. at 14–15.
175
To put it another way, the basis adjustment ensured that shareholders would not
be taxable on the appreciation of their stock attributable to profits that had been
taxed at the corporate level. Id. at 19. A third way to put the point is that the basis adjustment had the effect of a DRIP. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
But see Yin, supra note 124, at 470–71 (arguing that DRIPs may not achieve full
equivalence for taxation of distributed and retained earnings under the dividendexclusion model).
172
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tax preferences because utilization of those preferences would reduce the shareholder-level excludable dividends and basis adjustments.176 Fourth, the proposal did not change the tax treatment of
shareholders that themselves were exempt from tax.177 Finally, the
effective date of the proposal would have applied the new rules to
distributions and basis adjustments made after 2002 with respect to
corporate taxes paid for taxable years ending on or after April 1,
2001.178 In other words, the proposal would have applied integration to amounts already invested in corporate stock at the time of
enactment.
B. Lobbying Positions of Managers and Collateral Interests
Consistent with the heterogeneity analysis set forth in Part I,
corporate managers lined up on both sides of the dividendexclusion proposal. Influential lobbying groups representing managers pushed the Bush administration to make the proposal in the
first place and then dedicated substantial resources to promoting it
in Congress. But other managers opposed the proposal. Part of
that opposition stemmed from concerns about shareholder pressure to distribute earnings, and part was driven by concerns about
protecting tax preferences. However, the strongest opposition on
the management side came from non-manager third parties: collateral interests—specifically, those selling tax-preferenced investments to corporations—raised serious concerns about the effects of
the proposal on their industries. Those concerns clearly resonated
with legislators.179
176

See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 167, at 30–31.
See Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 21. Certain private foundations,
otherwise exempt from tax, pay a small tax on their investment income. See I.R.C.
§ 4940 (West 2008). The proposal would have extended the shareholder-level benefits
to those foundations. Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 21.
178
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 167, at 27. See also President’s
Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
108th Cong. 78–79 (2003) (question-and-answer between Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr. and
William Gale of the Brookings Institute).
179
The agency-cost explanation did not predict many of these manager positions and
it did not account for the existence and influence of collateral interests on the management side. The agency-cost explanation predicted that managers would adopt one
of two positions in response to integration proposals. The larger group of managers
would show “diffidence” toward integration. Although these managers are not hostile
to integration, they regard it largely as a windfall for existing investments, and they
177
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Managers generally showed strong support for the
dividend-exclusion proposal both directly and through their
lobbying groups.180 Perhaps no group was as influential as
The Business Roundtable (“BRT”), an association of chief
executive officers. The BRT claimed credit for having urged
the Bush administration to make an integration proposal.181 Once
President Bush released his dividend-exclusion proposal, the BRT
182
expressed unqualified support for it on Capitol Hill and in press
prefer tax subsidies for new investments. Because the dividend-exclusion proposal
applied to existing stock investments, the agency-cost explanation predicted that
managers would show unenthusiastic support for the proposal. The smaller group of
managers is hostile to integration because it undermines the retained-earnings trap.
The dividend-exclusion proposal generally equalized the tax treatment of distributed
and retained earnings, so the agency-cost explanation predicted opposition from this
group. Interestingly, the agency-cost explanation specifically predicted that managers
benefitting from the retained-earnings trap could be mollified by an integration proposal that does not pass corporate tax preferences through to shareholders and that
includes a DRIP. As demonstrated below, the inclusion of a DRIP in the dividendexclusion proposal does appear to have deflected arguments that the proposal would
force managers to distribute earnings. The fact, however, that the proposal did not
provide for the pass-through of corporate tax preferences provoked strong opposition
from both managers and influential collateral interests.
180
A red-herring issue should be addressed up front. While the dividend-exclusion
proposal was pending, the press reported that the White House was pressuring lobbyists to support the proposal. See, e.g., Laurence McQuillan, Investors Targeted in
Tax-Cut Push, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1A; Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Treasury to Extend Benefit of Dividend Exclusion to Annuities, Snow Says, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 5, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 43-1; Jonathan Weisman & Mike Allen, Bush
Seeks to Enlist Economists’ Support, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 2003, at A7; Jonathan
Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support for Growth Plan, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2003, at
E1, E14 [hereinafter Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support]; Jonathan Weisman,
White House Intensifies Push for Tax Plan, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2003, at E1, E7 [hereinafter Weisman, White House Intensifies Push]. It would be a mistake, however, to
infer from those reports that the support provided for the proposal by managers was
not sincere. See Interview with Hon. Pamela F. Olson, former Assistant Treasury
Sec’y, Tax Policy, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 22, 2008); Interview with Robert Winters,
former Chief Tax Counsel of the House Ways & Means Comm., in Wash., D.C. (Sept.
22, 2008).
181
Press Release, The Business Roundtable, The Business Roundtable Releases
Study Showing Positive GDP and Job Growth Impact of President’s Economic Package (Jan. 30, 2003) (“Last November, the CEOs of The Business Roundtable called
for enactment of a significant economic growth package that included eliminating the
double taxation of dividends for individuals.”).
182
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 62 (2003) (statement of John J. Castellani, President of The
Business Roundtable) [hereinafter Castellani, Ways & Means].
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statements.183 The BRT assured Congress that the Administration’s
legislative package would “provide[ ] exactly the kind of boost our
economy needs” and that the “dividend component of
the plan will have the single most positive impact on economic
growth in both the short term and the long term.”184 The group emphasized that it was “preparing to reach into its deep pockets to
fund a diverse lobbying, advertising and grassroots campaign”; it
considered the dividend-exclusion proposal to be as important as
free-trade legislation.185
Other corporate lobbying groups did not want to be left off the
bandwagon. The Tax Relief Coalition (“TRC”), an umbrella group
of more than 1,000 lobbying organizations that collectively represented more than 1.8 million businesses, formed a task force “to
launch a concerted campaign to promote the economic benefits of
[the] dividend proposal.”186 The American Forest & Paper Association “strongly support[ed]” the dividend-exclusion proposal to address the high effective tax rates on corporate forestry operations
and paper manufacturing.187 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
called the dividend-exclusion proposal “important” and argued
that “[w]hile the direct benefits go to stockholders, indirect benefits will accrue to the entire economy.”188 The National Association
of Manufacturers (“NAM”) “strongly support[ed]” the Administration’s legislative package and argued that “[t]he dividendsexclusion proposal is particularly important to manufacturers.”189

183
Janet Hook, Bush Plan to End Dividend Tax in for Changes, L.A. Times, Feb. 2,
2003, at A30.
184
Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 63–64.
185
BRT Prepared to Dig Deep in Support of Bush Tax Plan, Nat’l J.’s CongressDaily, Apr. 25, 2003 [hereinafter BRT Prepared to Dig Deep].
186
Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Interest Groups Line Up on All Sides of Debate on
Bush’s Tax Cut, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 4, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 42-1; see also
Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support, supra note 180, at E1; Weisman, White
House Intensifies Push, supra note 180, at E1.
187
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 240 (2003) (statement of the American Forest & Paper Association).
188
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 338 (2003) (statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
189
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 308–09 (2003) (statement of Michael E. Baroody, National Association of Manufacturers).
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Managers of individual companies also spoke publicly in favor of
the proposal.190
Interestingly, the BRT identified the expected windfall to existing investments as a reason for supporting the dividend-exclusion
proposal.191 Several managers even asked that the anticipated windfall be enlarged.192 It may be that, on this point, managers were particularly mindful of their own status as shareholders; any rise in the
values of existing shares would both increase the value of their own
stock holdings and increase the value of their unexercised stock options.193 In fact, it may well be that it was precisely this expected
windfall for existing equity investments that drove the ardent sup-

190

See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Companies Mobilize to Save Bush Plan to Scrap Dividend Tax, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 2003, at E1, E5; Weisman, White House Intensifies
Push, supra note 180, at E1; Verizon, Other Firms Rally Behind Bush’s Tax-Cut Plan,
Nat’l J.’s Technology Daily, Feb. 20, 2003. For additional statements of managers in
favor of the proposal, see, e.g., Letter from Robert L. Nardelli, Chairman, President,
and Chief Executive Officer of The Home Depot, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb.
7, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 27, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 39-170.
191
See Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 62, 64 (supporting the proposal
because of its ability to increase the value of existing equity); see also Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and
Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 38–39 (2003) (statement of
John J. Castellani, President of The Business Roundtable) (same). This, of course,
contrasts with the argument of the agency-cost explanation that the potential windfall
for existing investments makes managers diffident with respect to integration and that
“[m]ost managers . . . . should support” an integration proposal that would “minimize
windfalls by implementing integration in stages.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 365.
192
After the dividend exclusion was proposed, the Bush administration agreed to
modify it to treat income sheltered by certain alternative minimum tax credits as eligible for tax-free distributions. Jonathan Weisman, GOP Aides Revise Bill to Help
Big Firms, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2003, at E1 [hereinafter Weisman, GOP Aides Revise
Bill]. This enlarged the potential integration windfall (assuming such a windfall would
result) for existing shares of “such blue-chip giants as International Business Machines Corp., Ford Motor Co. and General Electric Co.” Id. The change apparently
was met with the approval of management at Ford Motor Co.; in May 2003, the company’s chief executive officer published commentary supporting the dividendexclusion proposal. Bill Ford, Op-Ed., Accelerate the Recovery, Wall St. J., May 13,
2003, at A18. The Edison Electric Institute sought to enlarge the anticipated windfall
through the treatment of income sheltered by other tax credits as eligible for tax-free
distributions. President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 258 (2003) (statement of Edison Electric Institute).
193
Ben White, Bush’s Tax-Cut Proposal Would Benefit Some CEOs, L.A. Times,
Jan. 13, 2003, at C5.
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port of managers and manager lobbying groups such as the BRT.
But if managers were in fact determining the lobbying positions of
their companies on the basis of how the dividend-exclusion proposal would affect them in their capacity as individual shareholders, they understandably did not call attention to that as they lobbied for the proposal.
Additionally, managers supporting the dividend-exclusion proposal made it clear that they preferred integration to the enactment of targeted tax preferences. For example, NAM mentioned
only at the end of its written testimony—after having already expressed unqualified support to the dividend-exclusion proposal—
that it “also believe[d]” that measures such as accelerated depreciation and the research-and-development credit “would benefit
the American economy.”194 The BRT went even further: in response to a question during his testimony before the House Ways
and Means Committee, the president of the BRT specifically said
that the BRT members preferred integration to accelerated depreciation and similar targeted tax subsidies.195
Managers expressed few concerns about the effect of the dividend-exclusion proposal on the retained-earnings trap. There were
weak suggestions that the proposal would benefit only shareholders of corporations paying regular dividends.196 That, of course, was
not accurate: the basis-adjustment feature of the proposal ensured
194

Hearing, supra note 189, at 309. The strong pitch for integration and the weak
pitch for targeted preferences is exactly the opposite of what the agency-cost explanation predicts.
195
Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 87; see also BRT Prepared to Dig
Deep, supra note 185 (reporting that the BRT president “showed little enthusiasm for
moves to add increased bonus depreciation” to dividend-exclusion proposal). As predicted by the agency-cost explanation, there were other managers who argued for targeted tax preferences over the dividend-exclusion proposal, although the extent of
that sentiment among managers is not clear. One news article suggested that “many
companies want to scale back the dividend cut in exchange for other tax breaks, such
as accelerated depreciation.” Howard Gleckman & Richard S. Dunham, Taxes: How
Many Arms Can One President Twist? Bus. Wk., Mar. 10, 2003, at 45. The suggestion
that “many companies” took this position is difficult to reconcile with the public
statements of the BRT and NAM; it may well be that the reporters on the news story,
consistent with industry practice, simply generalized a point made to them by only
one or two sources.
196
See Cha, supra note 190, at E5 (reporting that small technology companies that
did not pay regular dividends “have kept quiet or urged legislators to consider other
tax breaks”).
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that integration would not be conditioned on the actual distribution of corporate profits. More to the point, some managers objected that the proposal would interfere with their discretion to retain or distribute earnings.197 Nonetheless, this position was not
widely argued.198 It may be that (just as the agency-cost explanation
suggests) the retained-earnings trap benefits only a few managers;
or it may be that managers find it difficult to defend the retainedearnings trap in public.
More prominent than the soft protests from managers of earnings-trapping corporations was the strong support from managers
of dividend-paying corporations. Even though the dividendexclusion proposal would not have created a bias for or against
dividends, many managers of corporations that paid regular dividends lobbied hard for the proposal precisely because it would
have removed the double-tax bias against dividends. For example,
the American Gas Association, representing companies with more
than 80% of the market share for natural gas, said that its members
regularly paid out nearly two-thirds of their net income as dividends and that the proposal “would provide [them] a unique benefit.”199 Similarly, the Edison Electric Institute, representing companies with 70% of the market share for electricity, said that its
members usually paid out about 58% of their earnings as dividends
and urged Congress to “act quickly to eliminate the double taxation of corporate dividends.”200 The chief executive officer of Exelon Corporation, who said that his company normally paid out
about 50% of its earnings as dividends, and a vice president of
Texas Instruments Incorporated, who said that her company had
paid quarterly dividends for decades, both testified in strong sup-

197

Howard Gleckman & Richard S. Dunham, From All Sides, Bus. Wk., Feb. 24,
2003, at 34, 36; Jonathan Krim, Tech Companies See Bush Plan on Dividends as
Troublesome, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 2003, at E1, E2.
198
This is consistent with the prediction of the agency-cost explanation.
199
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 246–250 (2003) (Statement of American Gas Association); see
also AGA Sees Potential Boost to Gas Utilities in President Bush’s Proposal to Lift
Taxes on Corporate Dividends, Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Jan. 9, 2003, at 14 (describing
the benefits of the proposal to high dividend-paying gas companies).
200
Hearing, supra note 192, at 255–56.
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port of the proposal.201 These statements apparently reflected broad
sentiment among dividend-paying companies.202
Managers in particular industries did express definite concerns,
however, about the effects of the dividend-exclusion proposal on
corporate tax preferences.203 Those concerns resonated with legislators,204 including the powerful Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, who ultimately changed the dividend exclusion into a
reduced tax rate on dividends.205 The concerns centered on the fact
201

Promoting Corporate Responsibility Through the Reduction of Dividend Taxes:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Aff. & Product Safety of the S. Comm.
on Com., Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 17–21(2003) (statement of John W. Rowe,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exelon Corporation); Promoting Corporate
Responsibility Through the Reduction of Dividend Taxes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Aff. & Product Safety of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and
Transp., 108th Cong. 13–17 (2003) (statement of Elizabeth W. Bull, Treasurer and
Vice President, Texas Instruments Incorporated).
202
See Dividend Tax Repeal Proposal May Be Boon for Utility Shares, Nat. Gas
Wk., Jan. 10, 2003 (describing the benefits of the dividends-exclusion proposal to the
utilities industry). For examples of particular high dividend-paying companies that
supported the dividend-exclusion proposal, see Letter from Richard R. Grigg, Executive Vice President of Wisconsin Energy Corporation, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y
Designate (Jan. 15, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Jan. 30, 2003, LEXIS, 2003
TNT 20-68; Letter from David N. Parker, American Gas Association, to John Snow,
Treasury Sec’y Designate (Dec. 18, 2002), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Jan. 23,
2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 15-32; Letter from Martin A. White, MDU Resources
Group, Inc., to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y Designate (Jan. 2, 2003), reprinted in Tax
Notes Today, Jan. 23, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 15-38.
203
See Martin A. Sullivan, Dividend Déjà Vu: Will Double Tax Relief Get Canned–
Again?, 98 Tax Notes 645, 646 (2003) (“A dividend exclusion would have varied effects on different industries, so it would be a mistake to think there is unanimity
[about the proposal] in the business community.”); Lee Walczak, Howard Gleckman,
& Rich Miller, The Critics: A Fight Already Lost?, Bus. Wk., Jan 20, 2003, at 32, 33
(reporting that tech companies, real estate, and pension-fund managers favored redirecting tax benefits toward their particular industries). Remarkably, the agency-cost
explanation predicted that denying pass-through to corporate tax preferences would
make integration more attractive to managers. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 366–67.
The experience with the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal demonstrated exactly the opposite.
204
See Jonathan Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal in Bush Plan, Wash. Post, Feb.
26, 2003, at E1, E10 [hereinafter Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal].
205
See John D. McKinnon & Shailagh Murray, Washington Wrestles with Tax Bill:
Tensions Increase as House Proposes Options at Odds with White House, Senate,
Wall St. J., May 2, 2003, at A2 (reporting that Chairman Thomas supported a version
of the proposal that would benefit “[c]ompanies with lots of tax breaks”); Patti Mohr
& Warren Rojas, Interest Groups Test Bush Idea of ‘Single Tax’ on Dividends, 98
Tax Notes 1471 (2003); Jonathan Weisman, In House, Fight Brews over Bush Tax
Plan, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2003, at A5; Jonathan Weisman, Thomas Questions Divi-
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that the proposal conditioned the shareholder-level benefits of integration on the payment of corporate-level taxes. Managers argued that this requirement would create a bias in favor of taxable
corporate income over tax-preferenced corporate income and
would undermine the value of corporate tax preferences.206 The
high-technology and pharmaceutical industries, for example, expressed concerns about the effect of the proposal on the researchand-development credit; the energy industry objected to the effects
on tax preferences for oil exploration and the use of wind and
other renewable energy; and the construction industry objected to
the effects on the low-income housing tax credit and similar preferences.207

dend Tax Cuts, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 2003, at A4; see also President’s Economic
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 96–
97, 110 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Bill Thomas). At least one account argues that
Chairman Thomas changed the proposal at the suggestion of Vice President Cheney.
See Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 255–57, 269–75 (2008).
206
The agency-cost explanation suggests that managers may be leery of integration if
they believe that the revenue loss from eliminating the double tax would be made up
through repeal of specific corporate tax preferences. As proposed, however, the Bush
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal would not have been paid for by any
offsetting tax increases.
207
See Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1472 (describing the potential impact on
the low-income housing tax credit program); Dividend Break Might Undercut Federal Incentives, Tax Incentives Alert, Feb. 2003, at 19 (noting objections from companies that benefit from R&D credits); Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 197, at 36 (describing objections from tech companies); Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 195, at
45 (noting objections from companies that benefit from accelerated depreciation);
Greg Hitt & John D. McKinnon, Business Fears Dividend Tax Cut Could Undermine
Popular Breaks, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2003, at B4 (describing potential objections from
companies involved in research and development, school construction, and renewable
energy); Krim, supra note 197, at E5; Mohr & Rojas, supra note 186 (describing the
efforts of the National Council of State Housing Agencies in opposing the dividendexclusion proposal because of its potentially “severe[ ] adverse impact” on lowincome housing tax credits); Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal, supra note 204, at
E1 (describing the impact of the dividends exclusion proposal on low-income housing,
alternative energy, and research and development credits); Weisman, White House
Intensifies Push, supra note 180, at E1 (describing the opposition of the American
Electronics Association); see also Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan
Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services,
108th Cong. 28 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Joseph Crowley) (expressing concern regarding the effects of the dividends-exclusion proposal on R&D tax credits).
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All else equal, conditioning the shareholder-level exclusion and
basis adjustment on the payment of corporate-level tax would have
had the effect of making a corporation with low utilization of corporate tax preferences a more attractive investment, in relative
terms, than it is under the status quo. The dividend-exclusion proposal would have reduced the value of corporate tax preferences
and, correspondingly, would have raised the cost of capital for corporations relying on those preferences. This concern, however, was
not universal among managers. The unqualified support for the
proposal from the BRT, the TRC, NAM, and other lobbying
groups indicates that, in many cases, managers were willing to
trade the anticipated benefits of integration off against the anticipated costs of weakened tax preferences. But that baseline of
managerial support only underscores the importance that other
managers attached to their tax preferences. They defied both their
corporate counterparts and the Bush administration to press their
opposition. The status quo put them at the higher end of an uneven
playing field, and they fought to defend the advantage.
Importantly, the potential of the dividend-exclusion proposal
to reduce the value of corporate tax preferences drew
collateral interests on the management side directly into the
fray.208 Lobbying groups from the low-income housing industry
were the most visible, forceful, and relentless.209 These groups
did not represent managers; they represented interests
dependent on the ability to sell low-income housing tax credits to
corporations. They flooded Capitol Hill,210 the Treasury
208

As indicated above, the agency-cost explanation does not account at all for the
role of collateral interests.
209
See Sandra Fleishman, Dividend Plan Called Threat to Affordable Housing,
Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 2003, at A4; Weisman, GOP Aides Revise Bill, supra note 192, at
E3; Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal, supra note 204, at E1.
210
For legislative testimony, see Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan
Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services,
108th Cong. 101–11 (2003) (statement of James R. Rayburn, First Vice President, National Association of Home Builders); Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax
Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 42–44 (2003) (statement of William E. Spriggs, Executive Director,
National Urban League Institute for Opportunity and Equality); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th
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Department,211 and the press212 with their argument that the dividend-exclusion proposal would cause a serious contraction in the
supply of affordable housing. The case was straightforward. Corporations effectively constitute the market for the purchase of lowincome housing tax credits; those corporate investments in turn finance the construction of affordable housing.213 The dividendexclusion proposal, however, would have caused corporate managCong. 236–39 (2003) (statement of the Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coalition);
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 108th Cong. 185–96 (2003) (statement of Richard H. Godfrey, Jr., Executive
Director, Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation, and Vice President, National Council of State Housing Agencies); President’s Economic Growth
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 258–61
(2003) (statement of F. Barton Harvey, III, Enterprise Foundation); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th
Cong. 301–07 (2004) (statement of National Association of Home Builders); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 108th Cong. 313–19 (2003) (statement of New Markets Tax Credit Coalition);
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 108th Cong. 309–12 (2003) (statement of Raul Yzaguirre, National Council of
La Raza).
211
For correspondence with the Treasury Department, see President’s Economic
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong.
104–05 (2003) (letter from Barbara J. Thompson, Executive Director, National Council of State Housing Agencies, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 25, 2003)); Letter from Susan G. Baker, Co-Chairman, National Alliance to End Homelessness and
Trustee, The Enterprise Foundation, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 19,
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 27, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 39-169; Letter
from Conrad Egan, Executive Director, National Housing Conference, to John W.
Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Mar. 3, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Mar. 14, 2003,
LEXIS, 2003 TNT 50-35; Letter from Judith A. Kennedy, President, National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y
(Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 25-80;
Letter from Frank Schubert, Chairman, Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Housing Advisory
Committee, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y (Jan. 22, 2003), reprinted in Tax
Notes Today, Feb. 13, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 30-40.
212
For statements in the press, see Jan Breidenbach & Gordon Conway, A Cloud
Over Low-Cost Housing, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 2003, at B17 (commentary by lowincome housing advocates); Richard Moe, White House Plan on Dividends Needs
Renovation, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at D8 (commentary by the president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation).
213
In the question-and-answer part of his testimony before the Ways and Means
Committee, one lobbyist flatly asserted that “[a]ffordable housing is a noneconomic
activity” and that “[i]f we are going to bring the private sector in, then the Tax Code
is the way to do it.” Hearings, supra note 210, at 194 (statement of Richard H. Godfrey, Jr.).
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ers to prefer taxable profits over tax-preferenced profits so that
they could pass along excludable dividends and basis adjustments
to their shareholders. In effect, the proposal might have caused
managers to scale back corporate investments in low-income housing tax credits, raising construction costs in that industry. Although
it was generally assumed that these consequences had not been intended by the Bush administration, the lobbying groups representing the industry predicted very adverse consequences for affordable housing—and few in Congress wanted to identify themselves
with that outcome.214 State and local governments issuing taxexempt bonds and investment firms trading and dealing those
bonds objected to the proposal for similar reasons.215 They argued
214

See Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 21–22 (2003)
(remarks of Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (R-Tex.)); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 221–24 (2003)
(statement of Rep. Robert W. Ney (R-Ohio)); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2003) at 13, 210
(remarks of Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.)); id. at 41 (remarks of Rep. Kenny Hulshof (R-Mo.)); id. at 44, 127 (remarks of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones (R-Ohio)); id.
at 100 (remarks of Rep. Richard Neal (R-Mass.)); id. at 233 (remarks of Rep. Paul
Ryan (R-Wis.)); see also Mohr & Rojas, supra note 180 (“Several taxwriters from
both sides of the aisle complained that the proposal would reduce the value of the
low-income housing tax credit program.”).
215
See President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 155–72 (2003) (statement of Alan G. Hevesi, New York
State Comptroller); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 312–13 (2003) (statement of National Education Association); Letter from John R. Vogt, Executive Vice President, Bond Market
Ass’n, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y (Jan. 27, 2003), reprinted in Tax
Notes Today, Feb. 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 25-91; see also Greg Hitt, Bush Faces
New Tax-Relief Foe: Municipal-Bond Adherents Mount a Lobbying Effort, Wall St.
J., Apr. 15, 2003, at A4; Christina Ling, Bush Retirement Proposals Worry Municipal
Issuers, Reuters News, Feb. 11, 2003; Tom Petruno, California Pays Costly Yields on
Tobacco Bonds, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 2003, at C1 (reporting concerns expressed by
municipal bond fund managers in California); Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal,
supra note 204, at E1, E5 (discussing the concerns of the Bond Market Association);
William M. Welch, Bush Faces Bipartisan Opposition to Repeal of Dividends Tax,
USA Today, Mar. 4, 2003, at 6A. Similar concerns were expressed, although less intensely, about the effects of the dividend-exclusion proposal on credit unions and
banks. See Letter from America’s Community Bankers, American Bankers Association, and Independent Community Bankers of America, to William M. Thomas,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means (Mar. 31, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Apr. 3, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 64-29; Ed Roberts, Bush Stimulus Package
Could Effect CU Shares, Credit Union J., Jan. 13, 2003, at 8.
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that the expected shift by managers from tax-preferenced income
to taxable income would cause corporations to purchase fewer taxexempt bonds. The concern was particularly acute as to property
and casualty insurance companies, which ordinarily invest heavily
in tax-exempt bonds.216 Reduced corporate investment in taxexempt bonds, of course, would drive up the interest rates on those
bonds, thereby increasing the costs of borrowing for state and local
governments.
The lobbying positions on the management side, then, reflected
the heterogeneity of interests attributable to the unevenness of the
corporate-level tax. Many managers strongly supported the dividend-exclusion proposal; they even stated publicly that they
wanted integration more than they wanted targeted tax preferences. Other managers objected to the proposal because of their
concerns about pressure to distribute earnings or in defense of
their corporate tax preferences. The strongest opposition on the
management side, however, came not from managers, but from
collateral interests that claimed they would be seriously harmed by
the proposal. These interests elicited sympathy and support from
legislators and influenced the legislative outcome.
C. Lobbying Positions of Shareholders and Collateral Interests
A similar pattern of heterogeneous positions emerged in the
lobbying activities on the shareholder side.217 Support for the divi216

President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 250–52 (2003) (statement of American Insurance Association);
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 108th Cong. 152–55 (2003) (statement of Ronald Stack, Managing Director
and Head of Finance, Lehman Brothers, and Chairman, Municipal Securities Division, Bond Market Association).
217
The lobbying positions of shareholders occupy an almost inconsequential role in
the agency-cost explanation. The explanation identifies the anticipated windfall to existing investments as a significant (although not inevitable) characteristic of integration, and it predicts that individual shareholders therefore will favor eliminating the
double tax. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338, 347. The account argues, however, that individual shareholders face substantial collective-action problems that prevent them from lobbying effectively. By contrast, institutional shareholders do not
face the same collective-action problems, but many (such as retirement plans) may be
stifled by federal prohibitions on lobbying. See id. at 363–65. As applied to the Bush
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal, the predictions of the agency-cost ex-
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dend-exclusion proposal was almost non-existent among individual
shareholders.218 One retiree testified for the proposal at an inconsequential hearing,219 and a few individuals220 wrote letters supporting the exclusion of dividends. The scarcity of individual support
was highlighted by the fact that several large corporations—
including Verizon,221 AT&T,222 and General Motors223—sent letters
to tens of thousands of their shareholders extolling the benefits of
the dividend-exclusion proposal. Financial institutions and their
lobbying groups—such as Morgan Stanley224 and the Securities Industry Association225—made similar appeals to investors in addition
to supporting the proposal through direct lobbying efforts.226 But
planation regarding shareholders were in part correct, particularly as to individual
shareholders. However, the agency-cost explanation did not accurately predict either
the interests or lobbying ability of certain institutional shareholders, nor did it account
at all for collateral interests on the shareholder side.
218
This is consistent with the predictions of the agency-cost explanation.
219
Tax Fairness: Does Double Taxation Unfairly Target Older Americans?: Hearing
Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 55–59 (2003) (statement by Dick
Buxton). The hearing was inconsequential because the committee lacked any jurisdiction over legislation concerning the dividend-exclusion proposal.
220
See, e.g., Letter from Dewey W. Corley to John Breaux, S. from La. (Apr. 16,
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 1, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter
from Dewey W. Corley to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Apr. 17, 2003), reprinted in
Tax Notes Today, May 1, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter from Aaron Selber,
Jr. to John Breaux, S. from La. (Apr. 16, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 1,
2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter from Jess J. Waguespack to Jim McCrery, Rep.
from La. (Jan. 13, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Oct. 30, 2003, LEXIS, 2003
TNT 210-37; Letter from Nedland P. Williams to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury
Sec’y (Apr. 30, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 15, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT
94-35.
221
See Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support, supra note 180, at E1.
222
Letter from James W. Cicconi, Gen. Counsel and Exec. Vice President, AT&T,
to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (May 5, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May
22, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 99-29; see also George A. Plesko, We Don’t Really Know
What It Means, But We Support It Anyway, 99 Tax Notes 1275 (2003) (summarizing
an e-mail exchange with AT&T regarding the impact of the Bush proposal on AT&T
shareholders).
223
McQuillan, supra note 180.
224
Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 195.
225
Mike McNamee, A Love-Hate Relationship with Bush’s Tax Plan, Bus. Wk.,
Mar. 3, 2003, at 53.
226
See, e.g., Examination of Proposals for Economic Growth and Job Creation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 47–51 (2003) (statement of Phil
Gramm, Vice Chairman and Managing Director, UBS Warburg); Paying Dividends:
How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of
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even the enthusiasm of managers, brokerages, and investment
firms apparently could not shake individual shareholders out of
their indifference.227
Some institutional shareholders, however, played a reasonably
prominent role in opposing the proposal. For example, certain taxqualified retirement plans—along with closely aligned collateral interests—objected to the dividend-exclusion proposal, and organizations representing those interests lobbied against it.228 The concern
was that the proposal would equalize the tax treatment of holding
stock directly and holding stock through a tax-qualified retirement
plan. Under the status quo of the corporate double tax, holding
stock through a tax-qualified plan results in a better tax outcome
because dividends are effectively exempt from tax as long as the
stock remains in the plan. Although the dividend-exclusion proposal would not have changed the tax treatment of tax-qualified retirement plans, it would have extended that tax result to stock held
outside a tax-qualified plan. The plans would be worse off under
the proposal, as a relative matter, than they were under the corporate double tax.229
the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 18–35 (2003) (statement of Phil Gramm,
Vice Chairman and Managing Director, UBS Warburg); Paying Dividends: How the
President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital
Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the
Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 35–37 (2003) (statement of Rick Lazio, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Financial Services Forum); President’s Economic
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong.
269–73 (2003) (statement of the Investment Company Institute); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th
Cong. 133–36 (2003) (statement of John H. Schaefer, President and Chief Operating
Officer, Individual Investor Group of Morgan Stanley & Company and Chairman,
Board of the Securities Industry Association); see also Sullivan, supra note 203, at 646
(“[B]rokerage firm head Charles Schwab . . . is widely credited with getting the President interested in this proposal . . . .”).
227
An important qualification about individual shareholders: as argued above, at
least some of the support for the dividend-exclusion proposal among managers may
be attributable to the interests of managers as shareholders.
228
Hitt, supra note 215; Walczak et al., supra note 203, at 33.
229
At a legislative hearing on the dividend-exclusion proposal, Assistant Treasury
Secretary Pamela Olson specifically referred to the effect on tax-exempt shareholders
as a reason for preferring the dividend-exclusion model over the dividend-deduction
model. In the exclusion model, corporate non-preferenced income payable to taxexempt shareholders is taxed at the corporate level; in the deduction model, corpo-
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This was a genuine issue for tax-qualified retirement plans. At
the time of the proposal, those plans covered over forty percent of
U.S. workers230 and received a substantial share of corporate dividends.231 The proposal threatened to remove a primary advantage
of the plans as investment vehicles for employees, and that threat
was not lost on the employers sponsoring the plans or on the professionals selling investment, actuarial, and other consulting services to the plans.232 Although the plans themselves may have been
unable to lobby directly, groups representing employers and consultants mobilized to register their objections with legislators. The
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, which represents employers sponsoring defined contribution plans, and the American
Society of Pension Actuaries, which represents plan consultants,
both argued to Congress that the dividend-exclusion proposal
would discourage employers from establishing and maintaining
tax-qualified retirement plans and that this, in turn, would undermine retirement income security.233 Similarly, the Employee Benefit Research Institute, a think-tank for employee-benefit issues,
agreed in legislative testimony that the proposal would weaken in-

rate non-preferenced income payable to tax-exempt shareholders is not taxed either
at the corporate level or the shareholder level. President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement
of Pamela Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y). Although tax-exempt investors such as taxqualified retirement plans would benefit from any windfall to existing investments,
that provided little comfort: tax-exempt investors’ real concern was not the effect on
existing investments but the ability to attract future investments.
230
Satyendra K. Verma, Retirement Plan Coverage of Boomers: Analysis of 2003
SIPP Data 7 (2006).
231
Gale, supra note 116, at 839.
232
Dividend Proposal Could Hurt 401(k) Plans, Experts Say, IOMA’s Report on
Managing 401(k) Plans, Feb. 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Dividend Proposal Could Hurt
401(k) Plans]; 401(k)s Less Attractive Under Bush Dividend Proposal, Fin. Executives News, Mar. 2003, at 17; Walczak et al., supra note 203, at 33.
233
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 252–55 (2003) (statement of the American Society of Pension
Actuaries); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 319–20 (2003) (statement of the Profit Sharing/401(k)
Council of America). See also Patti Mohr, Taxwriters Examine Effect of Dividend
Exclusion on Housing, Retirement Savings, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 7, 2003, LEXIS,
2003 TNT 45-3.
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centives for plan sponsorship.234 Although the lobbying groups for
large corporate sponsors of tax-qualified plans—such as the
American Benefits Council and the ERISA Industry Committee—
remained neutral,235 the objections raised by the groups that did
lobby drew the firm support of legislators.236
The life insurance industry objected to the dividend-exclusion
proposal for similar reasons. Insurance companies sell deferred annuities to individuals as tax-favored investments; the amount paid
by the individual typically is invested by the insurance company in
a mutual fund, but the earnings from the mutual fund are not taxed
to the individual until she receives distributions under the annuity.
Thus, from the perspective of the individual, investing in a mutual
fund that holds dividend-paying stock through a deferred annuity
generally provides a better tax outcome than investing in such a
mutual fund directly. The dividend-exclusion proposal would have
reversed that outcome, making the deferred annuity disadvantaged
as a tax matter. Although the life insurance industry dutifully
claimed to support the Bush administration’s legislative package, it
nevertheless threatened to oppose the dividend-exclusion proposal
unless the Treasury Department agreed to provide a basis adjustment for annuity contracts that held investments in mutual funds
234

President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 174–79 (2003) (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Employee Benefit Research Institute).
235
Dividend Proposal Could Hurt 401(k) Plans, supra note 232, at 7. The neutrality
of these lobbying groups presumably can be attributed to the fact that the managers
of the corporations making up those groups were actively lobbying for the proposal
through the BRT and the TRC.
236
See Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Brad Sherman); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 9, 26–27, 46–47, 95–96, 105–06
(2003) (remarks of Reps. Nancy L. Johnson, Max Sandlin, Sander M. Levin, and Bill
Thomas); Patrice Hill, Accelerated Tax Cuts Receive Bipartisan Support, Wash.
Times, Jan. 29, 2003, at A1; Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1473 (“[Rep.] Cardin . . . expressed concern that the dividend exclusion would have the unintended consequence of reducing incentives for small business employers to sponsored savings
plans for their employees.”). Cf. Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the
Twenty-First Century: Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 495, 511 n.42 (1993) (implying that such objections from tax-exempt organizations would not have political traction).
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receiving dividends.237 The president of the American Council of
Life Insurers testified before Congress that the annuity business
otherwise could be “devastated” by the dividend-exclusion proposal.238 Impressed no doubt by the lobbying muscle of the industry, legislators pressed the Secretary of the Treasury to concede
special treatment for annuities.239
In short, lobbying on the shareholder side of the dividendexclusion proposal was anything but uniform. Although individual
shareholders were nearly silent, certain institutional shareholders
managed to register objections to the proposal. Moreover, collateral interests on the shareholder side were very active: financial institutions, such as brokerages and investment firms, supported the
proposal and tried to enlist their customers to do the same. Interests related to tax-qualified retirement plans and the insurance in237

See, e.g., Letter from Frank Keating, President and Chief Exec. Officer, American Council of Life Insurers, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Apr. 14, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, April 24, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 79-15 [hereinafter
Keating Letter to Snow]; Letter from Frank Keating, President and Chief Exec. Officer, American Council of Life Insurers, et al., to George W. Bush, President (Mar. 17,
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, March 18, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 52-20 [hereinafter Keating Letter to Bush].
238
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 129–32 (2003) (statement of Frank Keating, President and
Chief Executive Officer, American Council of Life Insurers). The insurance industry
reportedly took their objections directly to cabinet members and other presidential
advisors, issuing thinly veiled threats to unleash the lobbying power of individual insurance agents if the dividend-exclusion proposal was not modified to accommodate
the industry. McNamee, supra note 225. On the concerns of insurance companies regarding annuities, see Mohr & Rojas, supra note 186 (describing the concerns of the
American Council of Life Insurers); Letter from Steve Bartlett, President, Financial
Services Roundtable, to Members of the Ways and Means Committee (Mar. 5, 2003),
reprinted in Tax Notes Today, March 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 44-46; Letter from
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, American Int’l Group,
Inc., to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 26, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today,
March 7, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 45-56; Letter from Rick A. Lazio, President and
Chief Exec. Officer, Financial Services Forum, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (May 21,
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 29, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 103-88.
239
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 108th Cong. 19 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Jim McCrery); Mohr & Rojas, supra note 180 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Snow announced a revision of the
proposal to accommodate the concerns of the annuities industry). The insurance industry had another objection to the dividend-exclusion proposal: because of special
rules applicable to insurance companies, they would have been entitled to only a prorated exclusion for dividends that they received as shareholders. See Keating Letter
to Snow, supra note 237; Out in the Cold?, Life Insurance Int’l, Feb. 28, 2003, at 11.
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dustry, however, fought to defend their status as tax-advantaged
investments, a status that required either special treatment under
the proposal or the continued existence of the corporate double
tax.
III. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION
The analysis set out above demonstrates how the persistence of
the corporate double tax, at least within the recent past, can be attributed to the equipoise of interests favoring and opposing specific
integration proposals.240 The failure of the Bush administration’s
dividend-exclusion proposal underscores the magnitude of the legislative obstacles to integration. Even in the case of a proposal
made by a president whose party held majorities in both houses of
Congress, the support of certain managers, shareholders, and collateral interests could not overcome the opposition of other managers, shareholders, and collateral interests who preferred retaining the double tax.
The analysis also demonstrates the inevitability of those legislative obstacles and the doubtful prospects for integration. The corporate double tax imposes uneven burdens on managers and
shareholders, and it creates uneven opportunities for collateral interests. Any integration proposal necessarily creates winners and
losers among each of these groups. Legislative proponents of integration must either roll the losers or, to the extent possible, buy
them off with legislative concessions; it simply is not possible to
structure legislation that would eliminate the double tax without
provoking rational opposition from affected parties. In short, politically successful integration will be as messy and as imperfect as

240

Other scholars interpret the legislative failure of the dividend-exclusion proposal
differently. Dan Shaviro argues that manager “support for the Bush administration’s
corporate integration proposal was less than defeaning.” Shaviro, supra note 18, at 20.
Karen Burke and Grayson McCouch argue that the dividend-exclusion proposal
“failed to attract support from any major political constituency.” Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans into Tax Policy, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 747, 773
(2008). Shaviro, however, points to no evidence supporting his assertion. Although
Burke and McCouch cite a handful of sources for their position, they take into account very little of the legislative record set out in Part II.
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any successful tax legislation that changes the status quo for entrenched interests.
A. Implications of the Heterogeneity Analysis
In contrast to the agency-cost explanation, which crisply identifies “managerial diffidence” as the “key” to explaining the failure
of integration,241 the heterogeneity analysis does not imply that the
persistence of the double tax should be attributed to a particular
motivation or lobbying strategy of a particular interest group.
Rather, there are many and varied interests implicated by integration of the individual income tax and the corporate income tax, and
different integration proposals will affect those interests differently. One cannot say with confidence that managers generally will
oppose or support integration, or even that a particular group of
managers who oppose or support a particular integration proposal
would adopt the same position on a different integration proposal.
There is far too much heterogeneity to justify such categorical conclusions.
In the case of the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal, the basic story was that the strong support of many corporate managers ran directly into the opposition of other corporate
managers and, importantly, of influential and sympathetic collateral interests. Indeed, it appears that the collateral interests opposed to the dividend-exclusion proposal—such as groups dependent on the low-income housing tax credit, tax-qualified retirement
plans, and the insurance industry—were even more influential than
the corporate managers who raised concerns about the proposal.
The objections of these collateral interests, the “ripple effects,” as
the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee called them,242
struck sympathetic chords with legislators. No one in Congress
wanted to undermine the construction of affordable housing or the
protection of retirement income security. By framing the dividendexclusion proposal as inimical to those policy objectives, the collateral interests positioned themselves as formidable barriers to integration. By failing to accommodate the objections of those interests, the Bush administration effectively presented legislators with
241
242

Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 327.
Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1473.
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an integration proposal that they could not support. This experience suggests rather clearly that supporters of integration ignore
the effects on collateral interests at their peril.
A different integration proposal made under different circumstances surely could produce different results. Perhaps such a proposal would accommodate the concerns of the low-income housing
industry and the retirement-plan industry very well, but perhaps it
would not be as attractive to corporate managers. Perhaps it would
draw the active opposition of groups that supported the Bush administration’s proposal and the support of groups that opposed it.
The point is that any integration proposal is certain to benefit
someone and certain to harm someone else. The simple fact that
potential losers have been able to beat back potential winners in
the past does not imply that integration cannot succeed, but it does
imply that different approaches may have different prospects for
success.
B. A General Approach to Integration
Predicting what approach to integration might be more or less
successful is inherently problematic. The decisions of managers,
shareholders, and collateral interests to support or oppose a specific legislative proposal to eliminate the double tax likely will turn
on very fine considerations, such as whether a particular tax preference does or does not pass through to shareholders or whether
particular equity investments are or are not grandfathered. Such
details are not always determined ex ante; they can be modified
during the legislative process specifically for the purpose of attracting support and heading off opposition. The positions of managers,
shareholders, and collateral interests on any specific integration
proposal, then, potentially remain fluid as the legislative process
unfolds. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity analysis and the experience with the Bush administration’s proposal suggest that certain
integration models might be more promising than others as a starting point for future legislative efforts.
Any successful integration proposal must accept the inevitability
of winners and losers. The marked unevenness of the corporate
double tax ensures that integration will change both the absolute
and relative positions of managers, shareholders, and collateral in-
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terests; policymakers interested in advancing integration therefore
should craft proposals that build on core constituencies of potential
winners but allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate potential
losers, at least on a selective basis. This implies that integration
models pre-committing legislators on critical policy points generally will have worse prospects for success than models allowing legislators to maintain flexibility during the legislative process. Compromise is unavoidable, and any specific legislative proposal should
allow for that.
Policymakers also must bear in mind that the end point of a successful integration proposal likely will bear little resemblance to
the starting point. Even if one begins with a theoretically pure, internally consistent integration model, the relentless and often vigorous pushing and pulling of the legislative process almost surely
will yield an impure, inconsistent product. Actual integration may
have to draw ad hoc distinctions among otherwise similar transactions, corporations, shareholders, and industries—distinctions justifiable with nothing better than an appeal to political necessity.
There is no good reason to suppose that the legislative process that
has produced the uneven and internally inconsistent corporate
double tax would transcend itself to produce a theoretically pure
and internally consistent integration of the corporate and individual income taxes.
A general strategy of trying to contain integration losers suggests
rather strongly that policymakers should not pursue integration
under the comprehensive business income tax model. That model
does considerably more than simply integrate corporate-level and
shareholder-level taxes: it fundamentally changes the tax treatment
of non-corporate business by imposing an entity-level tax on all but
the smallest business enterprises.243 In devising the comprehensive
business income tax, the Treasury Department acknowledged the
broad and deep adjustments that the tax would require, and the
government suggested that, for this reason, the tax should be
phased in over a very long period.244 That cautiousness underscores
the basic political point that the comprehensive business income
tax—or any other legislative proposal that links elimination of the
243
244

Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 39–41.
Id. at 90–91.
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corporate double tax to reform of non-corporate taxes—
unavoidably draws additional interests into the legislative fray.
This is not to imply that the comprehensive business income tax
is not a sensible approach to general business tax reform or that its
political implications are so complex that Congress could not conceivably enact it. But if the legislative objective were simply to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes, the political
complications introduced by the comprehensive business income
tax would seem unnecessary and counter-productive. As though
contending with managers, shareholders, and collateral interests
were not enough, proposing the comprehensive business income
tax would provoke both support and opposition from owners and
managers of partnerships, limited liability companies, sole proprietorships, and all the third parties that have interests in the current
taxation of non-corporate businesses. Unless one made the policy
judgment that integration would be pointless without such general
business tax reform, it is difficult to justify a political decision to
pursue integration through that model.245
A second significant inflection point is the treatment of corporate tax preferences. As demonstrated by the experience with the
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal, this issue drives
a wedge among managers. Corporations with lower effective tax
rates, which include those making greater use of tax preferences,
have lower costs of capital than corporations with higher effective
tax rates, which include those making less use of tax preferences.
The pass-through of corporate tax preferences to shareholders
245

Of course, even a straightforward integration proposal might provoke support or
opposition from non-corporate businesses if, for example, they believe that removing
the bias against the corporate form would adversely affect their ability to raise capital.
Consider, for example, the effects of integration on the privately held corporations
eligible for pass-through taxation (that is, S corporations). See generally Martin D.
Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 665
(1992); John K. McNulty, Commentary, Preserving the Virtues of Subchapter S in an
Integrated World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 681 (1992); Deborah H. Schenk, Commentary,
Complete Integration in a Partial Integration World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 697 (1992). The
experience with the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal suggests, however, that many non-corporate businesses (and corporate businesses taxed as though
they were non-corporate businesses) prefer to sit out the fight over integration. It is
difficult to imagine a similar outcome if the tax treatment of non-corporate businesses
were openly put in play.
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helps preserve the relative advantage of low-tax corporations over
high-tax corporations, making integration more attractive to managers of low-tax corporations. Similarly, collateral interests that
capture returns from corporate tax preferences (such as builders of
low-income housing) generally oppose integration not providing
for pass-through.
That suggests that the dividend-deduction and mark-to-market
models—neither of which readily accommodates pass-through—
are not likely to be successful. A legislative proposal under either
model would indicate to managers of low-tax corporations and
sympathetic collateral interests that the intended endgame for integration is a leveling of effective tax burdens and a dilution of the
economic value of preferences. A legislator who proposed the
dividend-deduction model or the mark-to-market model likely
would be seen as pre-committed on this point. But there is no way
to please everyone. Managers of high-tax corporations should prefer the leveling effect of integration without pass-through, and
competitors of the collateral interests that profit from corporate
tax preferences also should want integration without pass-through.
Both groups, therefore, should oppose the shareholder-allocation
model because it effectively results in the pass-through of corporate tax preferences.
In the end, integration either will pass corporate tax preferences
through, raising the objections of high-tax corporations and sympathetic collateral interests, or it will not pass preferences through,
raising the objections of low-tax corporations and sympathetic collateral interests. The former approach is probably the more likely
to succeed, if only because low-tax corporations presumably have
more political power (as evidenced by their past success in securing
preferences). But the more promising starting point for policymakers likely would be to leave the point open and accommodate objections as they arise. Both the dividend-exclusion model and the
imputation-credit model allow integration with or without the passthrough of corporate tax preferences; both therefore allow policymakers the flexibility to make adjustments during the legislative
process. The experience with the Bush administration’s dividendexclusion proposal is instructive: although the dividend-exclusion
model can allow the pass-through of tax preferences, the Bush administration steadfastly refused to accommodate requests for pass-
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through, even in the politically sympathetic case of the low-income
housing tax credit. Had the Bush administration made adjustments—even ad hoc adjustments to allow pass-through of certain
preferences but not others—the outcome of the proposal might
have been different. Of course, it is also possible that selective
pass-through cannot be contained as a political matter. Once an
exception has been made for a particular preference, policymakers
may find they cannot deny similar treatment for other preferences.
Legislators should also preserve flexibility about whether to
condition relief from double taxation on distributions of corporate
profits. Although integration generally would remove the bias in
favor of retaining earnings, it may or may not introduce a bias in
favor of distributing earnings. Managers of dividend-paying corporations likely would prefer integration that requires distributions,
but managers of other corporations likely would object strongly if
tax policy swung sharply from an earnings-retention bias to an
earnings-distribution bias. Neither the shareholder-allocation
model nor the mark-to-market model conditions integration on the
actual distribution of corporate profits. However, as noted above,
both models effectively pre-commit to the pass-through of tax
preferences. The dividend-deduction model, the dividendexclusion model, and the imputation-credit model do, in the first
instance, condition integration on distributions; but all three models readily accommodate a dividend-reinvestment plan that—as the
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal showed—
extends the benefit of integration to shareholders without requiring actual distributions of earnings. As with the shareholderallocation model, the dividend-deduction model remains problematic on the treatment of corporate tax preferences; that leaves the
dividend-exclusion and credit-imputation models with greater
promise for success.
The next inflection point for policymakers is to determine
whether integration should eliminate the corporate-level tax or the
shareholder-level tax. There are potential political considerations
on both sides. Elimination of the shareholder-level tax generally
removes the relative advantage that tax-exempt shareholders have
over taxable shareholders (and, more generally, the relative advantage that lower-tax shareholders have over higher-tax sharehold-
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ers). The experience under the Bush administration’s dividendexclusion proposal demonstrated that this is no small consideration: tax-exempt shareholders that are themselves investment vehicles (such as tax-qualified retirement plans and tax-deferred annuities) will resist integration if it does not preserve their advantage
relative to taxable shareholders. Importantly, the concerns of these
interests—even though they are, at their core, simply concerns
about a level playing field—resonated with lawmakers. That suggests that the dividend-exclusion model is more likely to encounter
political turbulence here than is the imputation-credit model, because the imputation-credit model can extend the benefit of integration to tax-exempt shareholders by providing refundable credits
for corporate-level tax.246 Indeed, the imputation-credit model offers a high degree of flexibility on this point: under the model,
shareholder-level credits can be made entirely or only partially refundable, allowing the government to extend the full benefit of integration to tax-exempt shareholders or only so much of the benefit as is necessary to buy their non-opposition.
Still, the imputation-credit model may present its own difficulties. Over the past decade, European countries generally have
moved away from integration based on the imputation-credit
model to integration based on the dividend-exclusion model (or at
least reduced taxation of dividends).247 Although the driver of that
movement generally is internal to the law of the European Union,248 the fact remains that integration on the imputation-credit
model would put the United States out of step with the integration
approach now taken by significant U.S. trading partners. Certainly
that asymmetry is a cause of potential policy concern. Whether it
would also be a cause for potential political concern would depend,
in part, on whether U.S. corporations with international operations
consider asymmetric integration to be sufficiently troubling to oppose it outright. The experience with the Bush administration’s
246

Although the dividend-deduction and the mark-to-market models both eliminate
the corporate-level tax, they are problematic on the question of passing through tax
preferences. The shareholder-allocation model, like the imputation-credit model, can
extend the benefits of integration to tax-exempt shareholders. Again, though, the
shareholder-allocation model is problematic on pass-through.
247
Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1208–12 (2006).
248
Id.
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dividend-exclusion proposal provides little guidance on that point:
the proposed non-taxation of dividends generally would have harmonized with the newer European approach to integration.249 It is
at least possible that managers who otherwise would support integration might prefer the dividend-exclusion model to the imputation-credit model but nonetheless might prefer the imputationcredit model to the continuation of the corporate double tax.
Finally, policymakers would need to consider the effective date
of any viable integration proposal. Although the agency-cost explanation argues that successful integration could co-opt managers
by precluding windfall transition gains,250 the experience under the
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal indicates otherwise. Of all the managers, shareholders, and collateral interests
that committed lobbying resources on the dividend-exclusion proposal in 2003, no one appears to have objected to the possibility
that existing investments would experience a windfall gain. Rather,
managers pointed to the expected windfall as a reason for supporting the proposal and even asked in certain cases that the windfall
be enlarged. Politically successful integration, then, apparently
would extend both to post-enactment and pre-enactment investments in corporate equity.
C. The Policy-Politics Tradeoff
Contemplating the terms under which integration legislation
may be more or less likely to succeed draws into the forefront the
inevitability of a tradeoff between policy considerations and political considerations. Both theory and experience suggest that enactment of integration legislation would require Congress to minimize
the losses and maximize the gains among managers, shareholders,
and other parties with a stake in the corporate double tax. That, in
turn, suggests that policymakers should be prepared to pass corporate tax preferences through to shareholders, maintain the relative
advantage of tax-exempt and lower-bracket shareholders, and oth-

249

Graetz & Warren suggest that the European movement away from the imputation-credit model “may have influenced” the Bush administration’s decision to propose integration under the dividend-exclusion model. Id. at 1252.
250
Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 365.

DORAN_BOOK

594

4/15/2009 11:44 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:517

erwise preserve or even exacerbate the uneven effects of the status
quo for managers, shareholders, and collateral interests. The inherent flexibility of the imputation-credit model makes it a promising vehicle for political concessions and compromises: one can
readily envision a gerrymandered imputation-credit system that
passes through certain tax preferences but not others, that allows
refundable credits to certain shareholders but not others, and that
confers substantial windfall transition gains. In short, one can imagine an integration system that looks as imperfect as any successful
tax legislation that fuses sound theory with political expediency.
That raises the further question of whether integration would be
worth the effort. The strong consensus among academics and policymakers in favor of integrating the corporate and individual income taxes depends heavily on the argument that integration
would remove significant distortions caused by the corporate double tax. Perhaps successful integration would remove or at least
ease certain distortions under current law—for example, the preference for debt financing over equity financing—but the compromises and concessions required by the political process likely
would introduce new distortions. It is hardly clear that, on balance,
an actual system of integration that could emerge from the legislative process would be comparable to any of the theoretical systems
of integration that would enter the legislative process. The experience of the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal
might be most instructive on that simple point: there may be too
many entrenched and heterogeneous interests affected by integration to permit enactment of any system that academics and policymakers would consider a clear improvement over the corporate
double tax. Actual integration may be nothing more than a difficult
step sideways.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the corporate double tax reveals uneven burdens on
corporations, uneven burdens on shareholders, and uneven effects
on third parties that provide goods and services to corporations
and shareholders. The heterogeneity of existing interests directly
implies that elimination or mitigation of the corporate double tax
would affect different managers, shareholders, and collateral interests differently. Very simply, winners under the status quo should
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be resistant to integration, and losers under the status quo should
be supportive of the change. However, the analysis of potential
winners and losers becomes complicated once the widely varied
models of integration are considered. These models have heterogeneous effects on managers, shareholders, and collateral interests,
implying that any particular proposal for integration inevitably will
draw both support and opposition. The lobbying experience under
the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal confirms
the importance of these considerations. This implies that successful
integration—as with any successful tax legislation having significant effects on entrenched interests—would require extensive political compromises. In the end, actual integration may be as unattractive as the existing corporate double tax.

